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Abstract
There is now a worldwide consensus on the firm existence of a human right to freedom from
slavery. This consensus gives rise to what was thought to be an irrefutable argument that the right
to be free from slavery is a jurisprudential universal, with no competent legal system or government able to deny its existence or permit derogation from its tenets. This argument is now being
tested by the ideologies, policies, and actions of Muslim insurgencies in Iraq, Syria, and Nigeria, each claiming that the enslavement of non-believing combatants and war captives and slave
trading in such persons is permitted under Islamic law. This Article considers the implications of
these claims for the future of Islamic law and for its relationship with the world’s legal systems,
particularly international humanitarian law. It posits that the claims of these insurgencies, while
glaringly out of step with modern views of chattel slavery, should be taken seriously and actually
have a great deal of support in Islamic legal history. It argues that, despite the long presence of
slavery and slave-trading in Islamic legal and imperial history, there is now a firm jurisprudential
basis for declaring that slavery in Islam can and should be abolished, even under a government
bound by the Shar??ah. It asserts that Muslims and scholars of Islam must engage the Islamic
State and Boko Haram in dialogue on this point. It argues that the moral questions raised by the
continued specter of slavery in Islamic legal culture are profound and fundamentally more significant than any other questions facing the Muslim community at this time. The Article closes with
a pessimistic assessment of the future of Islamic law in its relationship with international humanitarian law and in its ability to improve the lives of its subjects, should Muslims and scholars of
Islam fail to achieve a community-wide understanding on the need for de jure abolition.
KEYWORDS: Dabiq; Slavery; Islam; Qur’an; Sunnah; Islamic Juristic Consensus; Moral Progress;
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ABSTRACT
There is now a worldwide consensus on the firm existence of a
human right to freedom from slavery. This consensus gives rise to
what was thought to be an irrefutable argument that the right to be
free from slavery is a jurisprudential universal, with no competent
legal system or government able to deny its existence or permit
derogation from its tenets.
This argument is now being tested by the ideologies, policies,
and actions of Muslim insurgencies in Iraq, Syria, and Nigeria, each
claiming that the enslavement of non-believing combatants and war
captives and slave trading in such persons is permitted under Islamic
law.
This Article considers the implications of these claims for the
future of Islamic law and for its relationship with the world’s legal
systems, particularly international humanitarian law. It posits that the
claims of these insurgencies, while glaringly out of step with modern
views of chattel slavery, should be taken seriously and actually have a
great deal of support in Islamic legal history. It argues that, despite
the long presence of slavery and slave-trading in Islamic legal and
imperial history, there is now a firm jurisprudential basis for
declaring that slavery in Islam can and should be abolished, even
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under a government bound by the Sharīʿah. It asserts that Muslims
and scholars of Islam must engage the Islamic State and Boko Haram
in dialogue on this point. It argues that the moral questions raised by
the continued specter of slavery in Islamic legal culture are profound
and fundamentally more significant than any other questions facing
the Muslim community at this time. The Article closes with a
pessimistic assessment of the future of Islamic law in its relationship
with international humanitarian law and in its ability to improve the
lives of its subjects, should Muslims and scholars of Islam fail to
achieve a community-wide understanding on the need for de jure
abolition.
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INTRODUCTION
The firm existence of a human right to freedom from slavery is
now acknowledged by the worldwide community of jurists, by all
major international nongovernmental organizations dealing with the
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recognition and enforcement of human rights, by organs of the United
Nations and regional intergovernmental organizations, and by all the
world’s national and municipal jurisdictions. These facts give rise to
what was thought to be an irrefutable argument that the right to be
free from slavery, like the right to be free from genocide, torture,
racial discrimination and piracy, is a jurisprudential universal, with no
competent legal system or government able to deny its existence or
permit derogation from its tenets.1 To the great surprise and grim
consternation of many contemporary scholars, observers and
commentators, particularly those who seek a place for the Sharīʿah
among the world’s legal systems, this argument is being tested by the
ideologies, policies, and actions of Muslim insurgencies in Iraq and
Syria and in Nigeria, each claiming that the enslavement of nonbelieving combatants and war captives and slave trading in such
persons is permitted under Islamic law.
This Article considers the implications of these claims for the
future of Islamic law and for Islamic law’s relationship with the
world’s international and domestic legal systems, particularly the
emerging system of international humanitarian law. It posits that the
claims of the Muslim insurgencies in Iraq, Syria, and Nigeria should,
from a jurisprudential perspective, be taken seriously and that such
claims, while glaringly out of step with modern views of chattel
slavery, actually have a great deal of support in Islamic legal history.
It argues that, nonetheless, there is now a firm Islamic jurisprudential
and legal basis for declaring that slavery in Islam can and should be
abolished, even under a government bound by the Sharīʿah. It asserts
that Muslims and scholars of Islam around the world must engage the
partisans, jurists, and ideologues of these insurgencies in dialogue on
this point, questioning both their view of the historical facts
supporting their claims and their understanding of the role of Islamic
law in contemporary Muslim communities. The Article closes with a
pessimistic assessment of the future of Islamic law in its relationship
with international humanitarian law and in its ability to improve the
1. In international law, the right to be free from slavery is part of the cluster of rights
arising out of the familiar jus cogens set of peremptory norms. LOUIS HENKIN, RICHARD
CRAWFORD PUGH, OSCAR SCHACTER AND HANS SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 91-93 (3d ed., 1993) (citing, inter alia, R. St. J. Macdonald, Fundamental Norms
in Contemporary International Law, 25 CAN. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 115, 131 (1987)). In many
national and municipal systems, the right is enshrined in constitutional and other fundamental
organic instruments. Perhaps the most influential national or municipal expression of the right
is the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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lives of its subjects, should Muslims and scholars of Islam fail to
achieve a community-wide understanding of the need for de jure
abolition.
I. BACKGROUND
The most coherent of the claims asserting a contemporary
Muslim right to enslave are those put forward by an organization
emerging from the dismantling of Al Qaeda in Iraq and known as adDawlah al-Islāmiya fi’l-‘Irāq wa -sh-Shām (“the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (or the Levant)”—“ISIS” or “ISIL” in English or “DAESH”
in Arabic). In 2014, DAESH declared itself to simply be the “Islamic
State” and, in a startling and rapid series of military advances, took
large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria. On June 29, 2014, the
group proclaimed a worldwide caliphate and its leader, Abu Bakr alBaghdadi, declared himself to be the caliph, an official who, by some
interpretations of classical Islamic political theory and law, must be
obeyed by all Muslims.2 In accomplishing their conquests, ISIS
2. Understandings of the concept of the Islamic caliphate are contested, wide-ranging
and have evolved considerably since the age of the “Rightly-Guided Caliphs,” the seventhcentury Muslim political leaders and companions of the Prophet Muhammad who inherited
superintendence of the Muslim community immediately after his death. The word “caliph,” or
khalīfa in Arabic, literally means “successor” and refers to the head of the Muslim community
who assumes the temporal functions performed by the Prophet Muhammad when he was alive.
These functions include, inter alia, the levying of taxes, regulation and supervision of markets,
command of the military and the conduct of war, appointment of judges and other
governmental officials, formulation of state policy in domestic and foreign affairs, and the like.
See generally Khalīfa, IV ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 937 (E. Van Donzel, B. Lewis, Ch.
Pellat, C.E. Bosworth eds., 2d ed. 1978). Professor A.K.S. Lambton observes:
As the temporal head of the community, whose internal organisation was secured by
a common acceptance of and submission to the sharīʿa, the caliph was the symbol
of the supremacy of the sharīʿa. He, like other believers, was subordinate to it and
they owed him obedience only as its representative. So far as there was an element
of contract in the relations between him and his followers this was to be found in the
bay’a (a citizen’s declaration of allegiance). Termination of the contract was only
permitted if a change took place in the status and condition of the caliph such as
might cause prejudice to the rights of the community. The weakness of the position
was that no tribunal was specified to decide upon his deposition. Id. at 948
(definition of bay’a inserted by the author).
The caliphal concept gained considerable substantive significance during the halcyon
days of the ‘Abbasid caliphate, based in Iraq, which functioned, in various incarnations,
between 649 C.E. and 1258 C.E and with great geopolitical impact between 750 C.E. and 950
C.E. It appears that the leaders of ISIS seek to model their “caliphate” on the example of the
early ‘Abbasid caliphate, which claimed universal authority over all Muslims, see HUGH N.
KENNEDY, THE EARLY ABBASID CALIPHATE: A POLITICAL HISTORY 41-45 (1981). See also
M.A. SHABAN, THE ‘ABBASID REVOLUTION (1970); PATRICIA CRONE, GOD’S CALIPH 92
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partisans have engaged in a variety of attention-grabbing behaviors
and many of these behaviors have been condemned as barbaric and
not justified by any rational interpretation of Islamic law or
jurisprudence.3 Many commentators have further argued that ISIS and
its leaders cannot even remotely be described as “Islamic,” opining
that it is more likely a cult or an aberrational or “deviant”
organization of misfits and criminals. At first blush, there is much that
seems to support these views. Traditional and even more extreme
interpretations of Islamic law would not, under any circumstances,
support the immolation of a prisoner of war or the beheading of an
(1986), or on a model the group claims was announced by the Prophet Muhammad. See
Andrew F. March and Mara Revkin, Caliphate of Law, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-04-15/caliphate-law. ISIS also makes a number of
additional claims that have recently taken on increased geopolitical significance. These claims
include asserting an entitlement to control of territory on the Arabian Peninsula, requiring the
overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and other oligarchies in the Persian Gulf and a reorientation
of the moral and political landscape in the Middle East. Patrick Cockburn has observed that
“[t]he birth of the new state is the most radical change to the political geography of the Middle
East since the Sykes-Picot Agreement was implemented in the aftermath of the First World
War.” Patrick Cockburn, ISIS Consolidates, 36 LONDON REV. OF BOOKS 3, 3-5 (2014).
3. The videotaped immolation of the Jordanian fighter pilot, Moaz al-Kasasbeh, captured
and imprisoned by ISIS on December 24, 2014, shocked the world and brought stern
condemnation from Muslim jurists, religious leaders and opinion makers around the world. See
Damien Gayle, Even Al-Qaeda Condemn Murder of Jordanian Pilot as ‘Deviant,’ DAILY
MAIL.COM (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2939536/Even-Al-Qaedacondemn-murder-Jordanian-pilot-deviant-leading-Muslim-cleric-calls-ISIS-militants-killedcrucified-limbs-chopped.html; Sami Aboudi & Suleiman Al-Khalidi, Clerics Denounce
Burning Alive of Pilot as un-Islamic, REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2015/02/04/mideast-crisis-jordan-clerics-idUSL6N0VE1QO20150204;
Umberto
Bacchi,
Jordanian Pilot Burned Alive by Isis: EU Condemns Jordan Over Retaliatory Executions,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES, UK EDITION (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/
jordanian-pilot-burned-alive-by-isis-eu-condemns-jordan-over-retaliatory-executions1486646. Prophetic statements are the basis for an Islamic legal prohibition of punishment or
execution by fire. The Prophet Muhammed is reported to have said: “Do not punish anybody
with Allah’s punishment (fire).” Translation of Sahih Bukhari Book 84, Vol. 9 Hadith 57, USC
CENTER FOR MUSLIM-JEWISH ENGAGEMENT, http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religioustexts/hadith/bukhari/084-sbt.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Bukhari] (collection
of Hadiths maintained by University of Southern California, Center for Muslim-Jewish
Engagement). Another account reports that he said: “[b]ut it is only Allah the Master of Honor
and Glory who punishes (a guilty person) with burning. So if you find them, behead them (and
do not burn them).” IMAM ABU ZAKARIYA YAHYA BIN SHARAF AN-NAWAWI (IMAM
NAWAWI), RIYADH-US-SALEHEEN 782 (S.M. Madni Abbasi trans., 1994) (citing Bukhari).
The ISIS organization has continued to engage in extremely violent treatment of captured
combatants and other captives, videotaping these incidents and making sure they are widely
disseminated on social media and through news outlets. See, e.g., Ben Hubbard, Grisly ISIS
Video Seems Aimed at Quashing Resistance, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2015, at A6 (reporting that
“ISIS carries out brutal executions in a regular way as a constant reminder to local populations
and to deter people from cooperating with its enemies.”).
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innocent hostage.4 On the other hand, Bernard Haykel, Princeton
scholar and leading expert on Islamic history and politics, has argued
that Muslims who call the Islamic State un-Islamic are typically
“‘embarrassed and politically correct, with a cotton-candy view of
their own religion’ that neglects ‘what their religion has historically
and legally required.’”5
Curiously, as we noted above, one of the most shocking aspects
of the panoply of ISIS behaviors actually does have an arguable basis
in Islamic jurisprudence. This is the behavior by which ISIS partisans
and military commanders take combatants and war captives as chattel
slaves. Such behavior is the result of their implementation of an
ideological policy, based on post-prophetic interpretations of Islamic
law and well-recognized views of Islamic legal history, permitting the
enslavement of non-Sunni Muslim combatants and war captives.
Press reports and United Nations documents indicate that at least
3,000 persons, mostly women and girls, are likely now held in such
slavery by ISIS.6
4. WAEL B. HALLAQ, SHARI’A: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS 330, n.38
(2009) (citing AL-MAWSU`A AL-FIQHIYYA, XVI, 151); Muhammad Munir, Debates on the
Rights of Prisoners of War in Islamic Law, 49 ISLAMIC STUDIES 436, 486 (2010) (arguing that
Islamic law, based on statements of the Prophet Muhammad, prohibits the execution of
prisoners of war and requires fair and humane treatment; also citing the opinions of the jurist
Ibn Rushd, who held that the person and honor of the prisoner must be respected and this
prohibits torture) (citing ‘Qur’an 76:8-9, which lauds the behavior of Muslim families after the
Battle of Badr, who ate only dates so that prisoners they were in charge of could enjoy healthy
meals); see also Mohamed El Zeidy, Prisoners of War: A Comparative Study of the Principles
of International Humanitarian Law and the Islamic Law of War, 9 INT’L. CRIM. L. REV. 623
(2009) (arguing that the International Humanitarian Law and the Islamic Law of War are
remarkably similar on the question of the treatment of prisoners).
5. See Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ (arguing
that the “Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic. Yes, it has attracted psychopaths and
adventure seekers, drawn largely from the disaffected populations of the Middle East and
Europe. But the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even
learned interpretations of Islam.”). Compare Bernard Haykel, ISIS: A Primer, PRINCETON
ALUMNI WEEKLY (June 3, 2015), https://paw.princeton.edu/issues/2015/06/03/pages/0027/
index.xml, with Kecia Ali, ISIS and Authority, FEMINISM AND RELIGION BLOG (Feb. 24, 2015,
12:01
AM),
http://feminismandreligion.com/2015/02/24/isis-and-authority-by-kecia-ali/
(stating that “It is not the job of religious studies scholars (or US presidents) to judge which
groups are ‘Islamic’ or ‘un-Islamic.’ Rather, we must understand how various actors make
claims to represent, understand, or further their tradition.”).
6. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Urged to ‘Stop the Madness’ as
Terrorists Trample Cultural, Religious Diversity of the Middle East, U.N. Press Release
SC/11840 (Mar. 27, 2015) (quoting Vian Dakhil, a member of Iraqi Parliament, reporting the
enslavement of at least 3,000 persons); Emily Feldman, ISIS Still Holds Thousands of Slaves,
Giving Brisk Business to Human Smugglers, MASHABLE (June 19, 2015), http://mashable.
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The claim that ISIS is nothing more than a cult or “deviant”
organization would perhaps have more credence if its claim to an
entitlement to enslave its war captives were an isolated one. One
should take note that Boko Haram, a West African insurgency
growing out of an organization known as Jamāʿat Ahl as-Sunnah lidDawʿwah wa’l-Jihād (“People Committed to the Propagation of the
Prophet’s Teaching and Jihad”) founded in 2003 in northeast Nigeria
by the late Mohammed Yusuf and now led by Abubakr Shekau, seeks
to advance a similar ideology. 7 Although Boko Haram has not sought
recognition as a State,8 it has also taken control of large swaths of
territory in northern Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger and its behaviors
have involved widespread pillage and destruction of Muslim and
Christian communities in those areas, with indiscriminate killing and
kidnapping of large numbers of innocents.9 In a widely reported
incident in April 2014, the organization kidnapped over 276
schoolgirls from a government-operated girl’s school in the town of
Chibok, northern Nigeria. Its leader maintained, in videotaped
speeches and Internet feeds, that the girls would be enslaved or

com/2015/06/10/the-vanished-yazidis/ (reporting 1,200 killed, 840 still missing and 4,500
taken as slaves by ISIS and reporting demands of upwards of US$20,000 from smugglers for
the emancipation of Yazidi families).
7. See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2015: Nigeria (Jan. 2015), http://www.hrw.
org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/nigeria (explaining that since 2009, Boko Haram
“abducted more than 500 women and girls from the northeast, of which over 100 either
escaped, were rescued by security forces, or were released by insurgents. Some abductees
suffered other abuses including sexual violence, forced marriage, and force conversion.”); see
also Missing Childhoods: The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children in Nigeria and Beyond,
UNICEF (2015), http://www.unicef.org/media/files/Child_Alert_MISSING_CHILDHOODS_
Embargo_00_01_GMT_13_April.pdf (women and girls who escaped describe having “been
subjected to forced marriage, forcible religious conversion, physical and psychological abuse,
forced labour and rape.” Additionally, “[c]hildren as young as four years old are being used
within the ranks of Boko Haram – as cooks, porters and look-outs.”).
8. Cf. Nigeria and Boko Haram Tracker, UNIV. OF S. FLORIDA GLOBAL INITIATIVE
ANALYSIS (May 4, 2015), http://www.usfglobalinitiative.org/newsletter/category/securityreview/ (reporting that Boko Haram has been re-branded as the “Islamic State’s West African
Province” through social media channels, suspected to be controlled by the Islamic State or
supporters).
9. Reuters, Female Suicide Bomber Kills 10 in Nigerian Region Racked by Islamist
Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2015, at A6; ‘Thousands displaced’ by Boko Haram Assault,
AL-JAZEERA (July 21, 2014, 21:12 GMT), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/07/
displaced-boko-haram-assault-2014721205656363368.html (recounting massive displacement
of over 2,000 residents of the Northern Nigerian village of Damboa by Boko Haram
insurgents).
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involuntarily married off to Boko Haram fighters.10 Since then, it has
continued to conduct abductions of large numbers of schoolchildren.
Its current leader has justified these behaviors using language
suggesting that Islamic law permits the enslavement and forced
marriage of female captives in a military jihad.11
The assertions of these two insurgencies, claiming an entitlement
to enslave combatants and war captives based on Islamic law, should
not be viewed as idiosyncratic, silly, or cult-based. There are a
number of other Muslim insurgencies operating in the world today,
some with plausible claims to legitimacy, and many of these
insurgencies have been known to take combatants and noncombatants as prisoners in a variety of circumstances.12 Should the
10. See Lynn, L. Taylor, Boko Haram Terrorism: Reaching Across International
Boundaries to Aid Nigeria in the Humanitarian Crisis, 21 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP L. 1, 7
(2014) (citing Nigeria: Boko Haram Admits Abducting Schoolgirls, BBC NEWS (May 5, 2014,
13:17 BST), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27284264) (Boko Haram’s leader,
Abubakar Shekau, released a video in which he stated, “God instructed me to sell them, they
are his properties and I carry out his instructions.”); Haruna Umar and Michelle Faul, Boko
Haram Denies Truce, Says Kidnapped Girls Married, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Nov. 1, 2014, 11:46
AM), http://www.timesofisrael.com/boko-haram-denies-truce-says-kidnapped-girls-married/
(in a subsequent video, Shekau stated, “The issue of the girls is long forgotten because I have
long ago married them off.”).
11. See April Nees, New Development: Boko Haram: A Textbook Case for Designation
as a Terrorist Organization and its Terroristic Threat to International Religious Freedom, 14
RUTGERS J. L. & RELIG. 498, 503 (2013) (Boko Haram’s current leader, Abubakar Shekau,
expressly stated, “[t]his is a war against Muslims and infidels.”) (citing to Videotape: Boko
Haram: Inciting Messages of Intolerance Against Christians, quoting Imam Abu Muhammad
Abubakar Bin in a direct video capturing his preaching); see also Taylor, supra note 10, at 8
(stating that Boko Haram justifies its conduct by claiming to strictly adhere to religious
ideologies of traditional Islamic Shari’a law. Boko Haram argues that the victims in the
Chibok student abduction were captured in a “lawful war”).
12. The most prominent of these insurgencies is the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan,
which has fought a war against both the Afghan government and non-Afghan military
interlocutors since 1994. See AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM AND
FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA 17-30 (2nd ed. 2010). There are a number of other
Muslim insurgencies, which, from time to time, also find it useful to take prisoners. Among
such insurgencies are those in Syria, the Philippines, Chechnya, Yemen, Kashmir, Somalia,
and Palestine. Hamas, which is an Arabic-language acronym translated as “Islamic Resistance
Movement,” seeks the total liberation of all of historic Palestine, including what is now Israel,
and the establishment of an Islamic state in that territory. Hamas claims to derive its guiding
principles from the tenets Islamic law. Hamas Covenant 1988, THE AVALON PROJECT, YALE
LAW SCHOOL (Aug. 18, 1988), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp; BEVERLY
MILTON, STEPHEN FARRELL, HAMAS: THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (2010). Hamas
has also, from time to time, taken Israeli soldiers as prisoners but there has never been any
suggestion of enslavement of such persons. The most recent Hamas prisoner, Gilad Shalit was
released back to Israel in exchange for 1,207 Palestinian prisoners in a prisoner swap deal.
Peter Wilkinson, Why Israelis Believe One Solider is Worth 1,000 Palestinian Prisoners, CNN
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claims of ISIS and Boko Haram find purchase among some of these
other organizations, the world will suddenly find itself grappling with
a reemergence of the scourge of de jure chattel slavery, a practice
thought to have been abolished in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Before exploring the implications of this
reemergence for Islamic law, this Article will first carefully examine
the behaviors of the ISIS and Boko Haram partisans so that we know
exactly what we are dealing with.
II. FACTUAL ACCOUNTS
Reports of the results of the ISIS and Boko Haram policies
effectuating a de jure enslavement of war captives have been horrific.
Almost all of the victims of the ISIS policy are members of the Yezidi
religious sect, a Kurdish-speaking non-Muslim, non-Christian, nonJewish ethnic minority inhabiting areas in northern Syria and Iraq and
southern Turkey.13 Researchers for Amnesty International interviewed
a number of victims of the ISIS policy and, in a December 2014
investigative report, offered the following accounts.
Arwa is 15. She was abducted in August in a village south of
Mount Sinjar with scores of her relatives and hundreds of
neighbours, and was held in IS captivity in various places in
Syria and Iraq, where she was raped, before escaping. Sixty-two
of her relatives, including her mother and siblings, are still in IS
hands. She told Amnesty International:
‘They took us first to Syria, to a place near Hassake. There
we were kept in a house with lots of girls. After 10 days a
group of us were taken back to Iraq, to Mosul, for two
days. Then I was taken to Baiji with one of my sisters and
some of my cousins, while four of my sisters and two of
my cousins were taken to Syria. In Baiji I was kept in two
different places and after about three weeks I was taken to
(Oct. 18, 2011, 10:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/17/world/meast/israel-prisonerswap-explainer/.
13. There are also scattered but persistent reports of the enslavement of Christian
women. See JESSICA STERN & J.M. BERGER, ISIS: THE STATE OF TERROR 215-17 (2015);
Islamic State’s Position on Christians, BBC NEWS (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-middle-east-31648888 (lasted visited July 27, 2015); see also the very recent account by
Rukmini Calamachi of the NEW YORK TIMES describing the enslavement of Yezidi girls and
women and the institution of a “theology of rape.” Rukmini Calamachi, ISIS Enshrines a
Theology of Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/
world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theology-of-rape.html.
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Rambussi, near Sinjar, with my 13-year-old cousin, while
my sister was taken to my mother who is being held in
another village with other relatives.
‘In Rambussi we were held in a house with five other girls.
There they did to me what they did to many other girls. I
was raped. My cousin was not molested; they wanted to
take her to marry her to a man but in the end they left her
with us and then we managed to escape. One of the girls
said she was not raped but I don’t know if it is true; I hope
it is true. Another did not talk about what happened to her.
The others were raped. The men were all Iraqis. They said
that if we killed ourselves they would kill our relatives.’14
A 16-year-old girl, Randa, was abducted from her village south
of Mount Sinjar with her parents and siblings and scores of other
relatives. She was sold or given as a ‘gift’ to a man twice her age
who then raped her. Her father was killed along with other male
relatives. Her mother, who was heavily pregnant when she was
abducted, gave birth in IS captivity and continues to be held with
scores of other women and children from the family. Some are
being held in Syria, others in Iraq. Randa and two of her aunts
and two uncles managed to escape at different times. She told
Amnesty International:
‘I was taken to Mosul and kept there all the time. First in a
building which they called the maqarr (headquarters). We
were about 150 girls and five women. A man called Salwan
took me from there to an abandoned house. He also took
my cousin, who is 13 years old; we resisted and they beat
us. He took me as his wife by force. I told him I did not
want to and tried to resist but he beat me. My nose was
bleeding, I could not do anything to stop him. I ran away as
soon as I could. Luckily they did not do anything to my
cousin, did not force her to marry, and she escaped with
me. I went to a doctor here, who said that I was not
pregnant and didn’t have any disease, but I can’t forget
what happened to me. It is so painful what they did to me
and to my family. Da’esh (the IS) has ruined our lives. My
mum gave birth while being held by Da’esh in Tal ‘Afar;
now she is being held in Mosul with my little sister and the
14. Escape from Hell: Torture and Sexual Slavery in Islamic State Captivity in Iraq,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 5 (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/
escape_from_hell_-_torture_and_sexual_slavery_in_islamic_state_captivity_in_iraq_-_english
_2.pdf.
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baby. My 10-year-old brother was separated from my mum
and is being held in Tal ‘Afar with my aunt. What will
happen to them? I don’t know if I will ever see them
again.’15

A third account, perhaps the most horrific in the report, is as
follows:
‘I heard that my 19-year-old sister Jilan committed suicide in the
place where she was held in Mosul two weeks ago,’ a young man
from Sinjar told Amnesty International in early September.’
‘Several girls who later escaped IS captivity confirmed the sad
news to Amnesty International in November. One of them, 20year-old Luna, recounted:
‘We were 21 girls in one room, two of them were very
young, 10-12 years. One day we were given clothes that
looked like dance costumes and were told to bathe and
wear those clothes. Jilan killed herself in the bathroom. She
cut her wrists and hanged herself. She was very beautiful. I
think she knew that she was going to be taken away by a
man and that is why she killed herself.’
Two other girls, aged 17 and 10, who had been held in the same
place, confirmed the account of Jilan’s suicide in separate
interviews.16

In a recent account published in the New York Times, Rukmini
Callimachi reported very similar events, noting that ISIS justifies its
enslavement of Yezidi women using a “theology of rape” and that
“the trade in Yazidi women and girls has created a persistent
infrastructure with a network of warehouses where victims are held,
viewing rooms where they are inspected and marketed and a
dedicated fleet of buses to transport them.” She further noted that “the
practice has become an established recruiting tool to lure men from
deeply conservative Muslim societies, where casual sex is taboo and
dating is forbidden.”17
Human Rights Watch recently interviewed 12 young women and
girls who escaped from Boko Haram custody after the school attack
and, in an October 2014 publication, offered the following accounts.

15. Id.
16. Id. at 8.
17. Callimachi, supra note 13.
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A 15-year-old girl who was held in a Boko Haram camp for four
weeks in 2013 described being forced to marry a militant more than
twice her age:
“‘After we were declared married I was ordered to live in his
cave but I always managed to avoid him. He soon began to
threaten me with a knife to have sex with him, and when I still
refused he brought out his gun, warning that he would kill me if I
shouted. Then he began to rape me every night. He was a huge
man in his mid-30s and I had never had sex before. It was very
painful and I cried bitterly because I was bleeding afterwards.’18

One Christian woman described being threatened with death or
violence if she refused to convert to Islam:
‘I was dragged to the camp leader who told me the reason I was
brought to the camp was because we Christians worship three
gods. When I objected to his claim, he tied a rope around my
neck and beat me with a plastic cable until I almost passed out.
An insurgent who I recognized from my village convinced me to
accept Islam lest I should be killed. So I agreed.’19

A 19-year-old girl who was held in a Boko Haram camp in
Gwoza told Human Rights Watch that she was offered thousands of
naira as dowry to marry one of the insurgents:
‘I refused the dowry, asking them to go pay to my father if they
wanted to marry me. An insurgent who knows my family
accepted it on my behalf. He told me he was afraid I would be
killed if I continued to refuse. I became confused at the
implication of being married to a Boko Haram member, so I
pretended to be very ill, and the wedding was postponed until the
return of the camp leader, who was travelling to meet the group’s
overall leader in the Sambisa camp. He ordered that I should be
taken to the hospital [in the local town] for tests before his return.
It was the break I’d been praying for. I threatened the woman
sent to take me to a hospital in town that I would scream and
expose her to Civilian JTF. She quickly walked away as I made
my escape.’20

18. Mausi Segun, “Those Terrible Weeks in Their Camp” Boko Haram Violence Against
Women and Girls in Northeast Nigera, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (October 27, 2014), http://
www.hrw.org/node/130172/section/6.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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III. DABIQ
As noted above, the justification offered by ISIS for the
enslavement of female captives is based on interpretations of Islamic
law. Since July 2014, ISIS has been publishing a multilingual on-line
magazine, called Dabiq.21 Although the magazine’s primary purpose
appears to be the recruitment of supporters of ISIS, including jihadist
soldiers, its authors also published a theological and legal justification
for the reinstitution of slavery and slave trading in territories
controlled by ISIS. In an article entitled, The Revival of Slavery
Before the Hour, the writers assert that “enslaving the families of the
kuffar [infidels] and taking their women as concubines is a firmly
established aspect of the Shariah . . .” or Islamic law and that any
Muslim “who were to deny or mock . . . [this assertion] would be
denying or mocking the verses of the Qur’an and the narrations of the
Prophet,” and is therefore an apostate.22
The article argues, based on a variety of Shariah sources, that
ISIS partisans have a religious duty to kill or enslave non-believers as
part of their struggle [jihad] against their enemies.23 It offers a very
brief discussion of Islamic scholarly views of the Yezidi belief
system, noting that even Christians regard the Yezidis as “devil
worshipers.”24 It concludes that members of the Yezidi sect are
21. See Until it Burns the Crusader Armies in Dabiq, 1 DABIQ, 4 (Sept. 2014), http://
media.clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-1-the-return-ofkhilafah.pdf (explaining that the name of the magazine was “taken from the area called Dabiq
in northern countryside of Halab (Aleppo) in Sham. This place was mentioned in a hadith
describing some of the events of the Malahim (what is sometimes referred to as an
Armageddon in English). One of the greatest battles between the Muslims and the crusaders
will take place near Dabiq.”). Dabiq is a small village in Syria mentioned in some Islamic
apocalyptic literature as the place where the malāḥim (literally “the battles” or, more
figuratively, the “final conflagration” or Armageddon) will occur. Malahim, 6 THE
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 216 (C.E. Bosworth et. al, eds., 1991); T. Fahd, Djafr, 2 THE
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 375-37 (B. Lewis et. al, eds., 1965) (referring to the kutub alhidthan and references to apocalyptic predictions in the histories of Tabari, Mas’udi and Ibn
Khaldun. Such apocalyptic traditions are actually more prevalent among the Shi’a); see also T.
Fahd, Malhama, 6 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 247 (C.E. Bosworth et. al, eds., 1991). In
Islamic history, Dabiq and the nearby plain have been a staging areas for troops and the site of
many battles, the most important being the battle occurring on August 24, 1516, when the
armies of the Ottoman Sultan Selim I defeated the armies of the Mamluk Sultan Kansuh alGhuri, killing him, and paving the way for the Ottoman occupation of Syria and Egypt. See G.
Wiet, Dabik, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 72-73 (B. Lewis et. al, eds., 1965).
22. The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour, 4 DABIQ 14, 17, http://media.clarion
project.org/files/islamic-state/islamic-state-isis-magazine-Issue-4-the-failed-crusade.pdf.
23. Id. at 14.
24. Id.
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therefore eligible to be put to death or enslaved under Islamic law.25
The Dabiq article cites the Islamic battlefield rules permitting
distribution of war booty, which would include non-believing women
and children captured during the conflict, to be divided among the
Muslim soldiers, after the obligatory one-fifth (“khums” or “fifth”) is
given to the head of state.26 It argues that such captives may be sold in
25. Id. at 15. The historical origins of the Yezidi religion and the provenance of many of
the beliefs and practices of its adherents are shrouded in exaggeration, misunderstanding,
mystery, and an equally profound lack of scholarly consensus. Some scholars trace the origins
of the religion to ancient Persian Manicheism, arguing that the Yezidi Kurds gradually
abandoned the veneration of the good spirit in Manicheism, preferring to engage in a
propitiation of those aspects of life represented by the evil spirit, which they believe has been
rehabilitated. Others ascribe its origins to Zoroastrianism, particularly as it was practiced in the
ancient city of Yazd, capital of the Iranian province of Yazd and an important center of
Zoroastrian religious practice. These practices emphasized the worship of fire. Many Muslims,
both Sunni and Shi’a, argue that the Yezidis are followers of a cult that venerates Yezid ibn
Mu’awiya, the reviled and corrupt second Umayyad caliph who brought about the martyrdom
of Hussain, the Prophet’s grandson, in 680 C.E. and the murder of eighty companions of the
Prophet and seven hundred readers of the Qur’an in Medina the following year. The
martyrdom of Hussein is recognized every year by the Shi’a in a holiday known as Ashura and
his memory is venerated by many Sunnis as well. Even if the cult accusation is not true, the
Yezidis in the Aleppo and Mount Sinjar areas actually do celebrate the life and exploits of the
Caliph Yezid, dedicating a panegyric to his memory and celebrating his birthday. This is an
anathema to many Muslims. Other scholars argue that the religion is a syncretistic amalgam of
Muslim, Jewish, ancient Christian and Zoroastrian practices and ideas, making it a useless
exercise to try to definitively identify its origins.
The Yezidis are in fact monotheistic but they eschew a eucharistic approach to God and,
by most accounts, reject the notion that the devil (Iblis or Shaitan in Arabic) is a fallen angel.
They believe that his act of disobedience was forgiven by God and that he is now God’s chief
angel (Melek Taus or “Peacock Angel” in Kurdish) who can provide human beings with
special protections. Yezidis will not utter the word Shaitan in speaking of the devil, believing
this is a sign of disrespect. This and other beliefs have caused many Muslims and Christians to
describe the Yezidis as “devil-worshipers” and there is a well-established body of Islamic
scholarly opinion holding that members of the religion should be killed if they do not renounce
their beliefs and convert to Islam. Most Yezidis are not Arab but rather are of Kurdish or other
Indo-European ethnicity, although some do trace their ethnicity to Arab forbearers. From a
Yezidi perspective, the ISIS murder, persecution and enslavement of their members is not a
new phenomenon. The Yezidis have been brutally and regularly persecuted by Muslims in the
region, both Sunni and Shi’a, for at least the last thousand years. Because of this, they have
become quite practiced in clandestinely observing their religious tenets and there are many
accounts of false conversions to Islam by Yezidis, who secretly continue to practice their
religion despite an outward profession of Islam. Much of this account is taken from R.H.W
EMPSON, THE CULT OF THE PEACOCK ANGEL: A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE YEZIDI TRIBES OF
KURDISTAN, 27-48, 70-88 (1928); see JOHN S. GUEST, THE YEZIDIS: A STUDY IN SURVIVAL
28-39 (1987).
26. See The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour, supra note 22, at 15; “Khums” is “a
one-fifth share of the spoils of war and, according to the majority of Muslim jurists, of other
specified forms of income, set aside for variously designated beneficiaries.” A. Zysow & R.
Gleave, Khums, THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM (P. Bearman et. al eds., 2015),
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a market by soldiers, “as mushrikin [polytheists] were sold by the
Companions (of the Prophet Muhammad).”27 It relies extensively on
ahadith (narrations of accounts of the life of the Prophet Muhammad)
reported by Abu Hurayra.28 It asserts that there has been an
“‘abandonment of slavery’ since the rise of tāghūt law and the
desertion of jihad.”29 It laments the fact that many Muslim men are
engaged in sexual relations with their maids and servants, which is
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/khums-COM_1417.
“The rules for the khums apply in the first instance to moveable property, which includes the
captured slaves of the non-Muslim enemy. In the case of combatants taken prisoner and
captive women and children, the rule of the khums is applied most straightforwardly when
these are enslaved and form part of the booty to be divided.” Id. The origin of the rule appears
to derive from the pre-Islamic practice of setting aside one-fourth or one-fifth of booty
captured by Bedouin raiders for the benefit of the commander. Id. The Qur’an modified this
rule by dedicating such portions of war booty to benefit the public interest, specifically the
Prophet and the poor, the needy and the disenfranchised in the community. See The Meaning
of the Holy Qur’an, 8:41 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., new rev. 9th ed. 1997) [hereinafter
Qur’an]. Verse 8:41 states:
And know that out of all the booty that ye may acquire (in war), a fifth share is
assigned to Allah—and to the Messenger, and to near relatives, orphans, the needy,
and the wayfarer—if ye do believe in Allah and in the revelation We sent down to
Our servant on the Day of Testing—the Day of the meeting of the two forces. For
Allah hath power over all things. Id.
This verse has been has been the subject of a variety of interpretations, depending on the
school of law, and all emphasize the importance of the public interest in making the division
mandated by the verse. The other four-fifths, variously described in the juristic literature as
ghanīma (“war booty”) or fayʿ (spoils obtained after fighting is concluded) are then divided
among the soldiers, with special provisions for the reward of bravery or other extraordinary
service. See F. Lokkegaard, G’hanima, 2 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 1005-06 (B. Lewis
et. al, eds., 1965); F’ay’, 2 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 869-70 (B. Lewis et. al, eds.,
1965).
27. See The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour, supra note 22, at 15. This account of the
law is also confirmed by Tabari:
[Muslim jurists] agreed unanimously that if women and children are captured and
taken to the Territory of Islam, they should be [considered] booty and that if the
army [combatants] have enslaved them and faced their [enemy] combatants in a
desert land that is not owned by them [the Muslims], the Imam should not honor
them [with manumission]. AL-TABARI’S BOOK OF JIHAD 287 (Yasir S. Ibrahim, ed.
and trans., 2007).
28. See The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour, supra note 22, at 15. Abu Hurayra has
been the source of an enormous amount of commentary in the religious literature and is still an
object of controversy as there no unanimity on his status as a reliable source. FATIMA
MERNISSI, THE VEIL AND THE MALE ELITE: A FEMINIST INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN’S
RIGHTS IN ISLAM, 58 (Mary Jo Lakeland, trans., 1987) (describing Abu Hurayra as a
misogynist narrator of hadith).
29. See The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour, supra note 22, at 16. “ṭāghūt” law refers
to law promulgated by a regime that privileges or permits idolatry and sorcery. See Qur’an,
supra note 26, 4:51.
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fornication or adultery under Islamic law, and it would be better, so
the writers say, if these maids and servants were legally owned
concubines, thus relieving the men in these relationships of the moral
and legal reprobation associated with fornication and adultery.30
The publication of these purported justifications for the
enslavement of the Yezidi women received widespread negative
treatment in the Western press31 and ISIS then published a second
justificatory article, also in Dabiq, purportedly authored by a
woman.32 The article seeks to meet the criticism and skepticism
generated by the first article and provides a much more textually
based Islamic legal justification for the enslavement of war captives,
citing verses in the Qur’an and examples from accounts of the
Prophet Muhammad’s conduct of war, including a report that he
confirmed the ruling of a judge/arbitrator ordering the beheading of
the male members of a disloyal Jewish tribe and the enslavement of
their women and children.33 The Dabiq article shows a particular
30. See The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour, supra note 22, at 17.
31. See Terrence McCoy, The Disturbing Way the Islamic State Justifies Raping and
Enslaving Women, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 13, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2014/10/13/the-disturbing-way-the-islamic-state-justifies-raping-andenslaving-women/; see also Allen McDuffee, ISIS is Now Bragging About Enslaving Women
and Children, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2014/10/isis-confirms-and-justifies-enslaving-yazidis-in-new-magazine-article/38139
4/; ISIS Jihadist Boast of Enslaving Yazidi Women, AL ARABIYA NEWS (Oct. 13, 2014), http://
english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2014/10/13/ISIS-declares-return-of-slavery-.html;
Salma Abdelaziz, ISIS States its Justification for the Enslavement of Women, CNN (last
updated Oct. 13, 2014, 11:16 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/12/world/meast/isis-justificat
ion-slavery.
32. Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah, Slave-girls or prostitutes?, 9 DABIQ 44, http://www.
joshualandis.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/Dabiq-9-They-Plot-and-Allah-Plots-compresse
d.pdf
33. Id. at 45. In the incident referred to, the Prophet Muhammad, after establishing the
new Islamic state in Medina, entered into a treaty with the Jewish tribe, the Banu Quraydhah.
Members of the tribe had been duplicitous and were secretly negotiating against the new
Muslim entity, siding with non-Muslim tribes that attacked Medina during the Battle of Ahzab.
Imam Muslim, 3 SAHIH MUSLIM: BEING THE TRADITIONS OF THE SAYINGS AND DOINGS OF
THE PROPHET MUHAMAD AS NARRATED BY HIS COMPANIONS AND COMPILED UNDER THE
TITLE AL-JAMI’-US- SAHIH, No. 4364-70 (Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, trans). The Muslims
prevailed and the Prophet laid siege on the Jewish tribe. After enduring much hardship the
tribe surrendered and agreed to accept the verdict of an ally, S’ad ibn Mu’adh, as to what
should be done with them. Id. S’ad decided that the able-bodied men in the tribe should be
killed, the women and children “taken prisoner” (enslaved), and their property distributed
among the Muslims as war booty. Id. The compiler of the hadith notes that S’ad ibn Mu’adh
rendered the decision “in light of the teachings of the Torah, which was the Divine Code of
conduct for the Jews . . . ” citing Deuteronomy 20:10-14, which mandates the killing of male
members and the enslavement of the women and children of any city making war against the
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concern with the fact that prominent Muslims have criticized the
practices of the Islamic State and that many ISIS supporters
defensively denied the behavior of the soldiers after being confronted
in the Western media.34 It then unabashedly again declares that the
enslavement of non-believing female captives (described as the
practice of sabi)35 is mandated by the religious law, arguing that
widespread concubinage is better than prostitution. It asserts that the
Islamic State’s policies, when looked at in a “true light” rather than
the “false light” of the Western press and the arguments of some
Muslim scholars, will bring voluntary conversions to Islam to the
captives, with the benefits of marriage and kind treatment of the
captives in such circumstances. It denies that concubinage is a policy
founded on pleasure and it denies that sexual intercourse with female
captives in such circumstances is rape.36 It closes with a reference to
First Lady of the United States Michelle Obama, speculating that her
price “won’t exceed even a third of a dinar, and a third of a dinar is
too much for her.”37
IV. THREE QUESTIONS
The ideological policies and behaviors of these insurgencies,
advocating for the reinstitution of slavery and slave-trading as
Jewish state. Id. at No. 4364 n.2240. This account shows that the event may not confirm an
“Islamic” justification for the treatment of the Jewish captives, as the decision purported to be
an application of Jewish law. Other modern accounts of the incident confirm the importance of
the execution of the able-bodied men as an application of Jewish law but often omit references
to the enslavement of the women and children. See, e.g., AHMED AL-DAWOODY, THE ISLAMIC
LAW OF WAR: JUSTIFICATIONS AND REGULATIONS, 27 (2011). Cf. Munir, supra note 4
(pointing out that there is considerable historical criticism questioning the standard account of
the incident involving the Banu Quraydhah).
34. al-Muhajirah, supra note 32, at 47-49.
35. Sabi or Saby is the practice of taking prisoners or captives, especially women and
girls, during war or hostilities. See HANS WEHR, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN WRITTEN
ARABIC (ARABIC – ENGLISH) 461 (J Milton Cowan ed., 4th ed. 1979).
36. As Mohammad Fadel has observed, there is actually very little discussion of this
specific issue in the pre-modern fiqh (private conversation). There are, of course, general rules
mandating kind and humane treatment of slaves which, by modern sensibilities, would prohibit
forcing a captive to engage in sex with her captor. One should remember, however, that, at the
time these rules were crafted, even wives could not lawfully refuse to have sex with their
husbands. See KECIA ALI, MARRIAGE AND SLAVERY IN EARLY ISLAM 194 (2010).
37. See al-Muhajirah, supra note 32, at 49. There is obviously a very sinister reason for
this reference. It is quite possible that the remark found its way into the article because Mrs.
Michelle Obama is African-American. The history of African-American slavery is well
known. Query whether the same remark would have been made about former First Ladies
Laura Bush or Hillary Rodham Clinton.
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instruments of war, have understandably outraged most people,
including diplomats, journalists, government officials, and ordinary
observers, Muslim and non-Muslim, around the world. The policies
and behaviors also raise troubling philosophical and jurisprudential
questions for scholars of Islam, Muslim and non-Muslim, on at least
three completely different levels.
First, the use of norms of Islamic jurisprudence and longstanding but also long-moribund, dormant and anachronistic rulings
from the Muslim fiqh38 to justify the reinstitution of slavery and
slave-trading in the name of Islam confronts believing Muslims
around the world with a moral issue most have long sought to avoid.
The fact that the Sharīʿah never formally abolished slavery and that,
theoretically, Muslims might therefore continue to capture, own and
trade in slaves has been largely ignored by almost all believing
Muslims. It seems that Muslims considered the likelihood of such
events and participation in such behaviors to be juridical and social
impossibilities in the modern world, particularly after the worldwide
abolition and effective disappearance of de jure chattel slavery and
slave trading in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Historians have, to some extent, documented this widely acclaimed
set of events. They agree that the recognition of a human right to be
free from slavery and the widespread development of a consensus of
opinion on the issue followed a “sea change” in attitudes on the
morality of slavery in nineteenth century Europe and in the Western
Hemisphere.39

38. The fiqh is the positive law governing Muslims, derived by jurists from the sources
of the Sharīʿ’ah. WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES: AN
INTRODUCTION TO SUNNI USUL AL-FIQH, 153-61 (1997); Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An
Overview of its Origin and Elements, 7 J. OF ISLAMIC LAW AND CULTURE 27, 50-67 (2002).
For a wide-ranging and informative description of fiqh and its role in the formulation of
Islamic jurisprudence see Asifa Quraishi, Who Says Shari’a Demands the Stoning of Women?
A Description of Islamic Law and Constitutionalism, 1 BERK. J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC LAW
163 (2008).
39. DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION:
1770-1823, 41-48 (1975) (“The emergence of an international antislavery opinion represented
a momentous turning point in the evolution of man’s moral perception, and thus in man’s
image of himself.”). See further discussion in Davis’ other works: THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY
IN WESTERN CULTURE 25-28 (1966); SLAVERY AND HUMAN PROGRESS (1984); see also
ROBIN BLACKBURN, THE OVERTHROW OF COLONIAL SLAVERY: 1776-1848, 61-63 (1988)
(“The 1750s and 1760s witnessed open stirrings of colonial revolt as well as the beginnings of
the sea-change in educated opinion towards slavery.”); JENNY S. MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE
TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2012) (arguing that the
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Historical research also suggests, however, that there was no
great “sea change” in attitudes on the morality of slavery in the
Muslim world.40 Nonetheless, de jure chattel slavery and slave trading
gradually disappeared or the practices were stamped out in the
Muslim world by a combination of firm diplomatic, military and
naval pressure from colonial and post-colonial governments,
economic incentives designed to encourage entrepreneurs and traders
to cease dealing in slaves, and reward schemes visited upon heads of
national and local elites in Muslim communities.41 Muslims therefore
generally missed the opportunity to confront, using norms from their
own legal system, the profound moral dilemmas presented by the
prospect of legal regimes allowing slavery and slave trading, even
though the Sharīʿah theoretically continued to permit it.42 With the
advent of the strident assertions of ISIS and Boko Haram, the era of
Muslim ostrich-like avoidance of the issue of the morality and legality
of slavery in Islam has now come to an ignominious and very sad and
ugly end.43
Secondly, the institution of these policies by ISIS and Boko
Haram presents a direct challenge to proponents of the universalist
principles that underlie international humanitarian law. This challenge
forces scholars to consider the utility and effectiveness of the idea of
international campaign against the slave trade was the engine behind the establishment of
international tribunals enforcing human rights norms).
40. WILLIAM GERVASE CLARENCE-SMITH, ISLAM AND THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY
(2006); Ehud R. Toledano, Enslavement and Abolition in Muslim Societies, 48 THE JOURNAL
OF AFRICAN HISTORY 481, 481-85 (2007) (reviewing WILLIAM GERVASE CLARENCE-SMITH,
ISLAM AND THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY (2006)); Bernard K. Freamon, Straight, No Chaser:
Slavery, Abolition and Modern Islamic Thought, in INDIAN OCEAN SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF
ABOLITION (Robert Harms, Bernard K. Freamon & David W. Blight eds., 2013).
41. See generally ABOLITION AND ITS AFTERMATH IN INDIAN OCEAN AFRICA AND ASIA
(Gwyn Campbell, ed. 2005); EHUD R. TOLEDANO, SLAVERY AND ABOLITION IN THE
OTTOMAN MIDDLE EAST (1998). It is important to note that the process leading to de jure
abolition in the Muslim world was certainly not uniform. Abolition was accomplished with
comparative ease in Egypt, Tunisia and what would later become the Palestinian Territories
and Israel yet, in other locales, like The Sudan, India, and the Arabian Peninsula, de jure
chattel slavery persisted well into the twentieth century. SUZANNE MIERS, SLAVERY IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY: EVOLUTION OF A GLOBAL PROBLEM (2003); see also ISMAEL M.
MONTANA, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN OTTOMAN TUNISIA 74-95 (2013).
42. For a recent forthright attempt to deal with this dilemma, see Sabrina F. Mirza, The
Divine Master-Servant Relationship: Why Islam Cannot Theologically Support the Abolition of
Slavery (unpublished paper on file with the author).
43. See Freamon, supra note 40. For a recent example of one important Islamic scholar’s
effort to end such avoidance see Khaled Abou El Fadl, UCLA Law Professor, Lecture at the
UCLA: ISIS and the Enslavement and Trafficking of Women (Apr. 9, 2015).
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value monism, championed by a number of contemporary
philosophers and legal scholars—most prominently the late Ronald
Dworkin.44 Even though the universalist assertions of the
international humanitarian jurists are sincerely put forward, one
should not ignore the fact that there are powerful and deep-rooted
reasons why Muslims in Iraq and Syria, and their salafist allies in
other parts of the Middle East and Europe, have chosen to reestablish
an Islamic caliphate in the region. These reasons, rooted in part in a
profound sense of cultural, moral, religious, and ethnic loss and
emptiness produced by the era of European colonialism, are not
remedied by the rise of the enlightenment-centered vision of value
monism that drives the imposition of international humanitarian law,
no matter how well-intentioned such assertions might be.
Juxtaposed against the assertions of the value monists, whose
theories would support the claim that certain principles in
international humanitarian law must be applied under all
circumstances, are the assertions of the value pluralists, expressed
most eloquently by the writings of the late Isaiah Berlin, who
maintain that conflicting policies and values advanced by different
legal and cultural systems should be recognized as within the human
“moral horizon” and, in some cases, allowed to flourish, even though
many might disagree with them.45 This is not to suggest that Isaiah
44. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011); see also Jack
Donnelly, The Social Construction of International Human Rights, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS 76,
99-100 (Richard Falk, Hilal Elver, and Lisa Hajjar, eds.) (recognizing a continuing and
deepening commitment to a “basic moral equality of all human beings that provides the core of
the vision of human dignity underlying international recognition of human rights”).
45. See Isaiah Berlin, The Pursuit of an Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY:
CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 1-19 (2nd rev. ed. 2013); Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of
Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1970); Isaiah Berlin, Giambattista Vico and Cultural
History, in THE CROOKED TIMBER 49-67 (1983). The classic formulation of the idea of
pluralism in the legal sphere is expressed in Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988); see also Robert D. Sloane, Human Rights for Hedgehogs?: Value
Pluralism, International Law, and Some Reservations of the Fox, 90 B.U.L. REV. 975 (2010).
There is a burgeoning discourse on the utility of pluralist ideas in Islamic post-colonial
settings, although the discourse has not directly confronted assertions that Muslims should be
permitted to enslave others under their “indigenous” law. See, e.g., David Wolitz,
Indeterminacy, Value Pluralism and Tragic Cases, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 592 (2014); Robin Perry,
Balancing Rights or Building Rights? Reconciling the Right to Use Customary Systems of Law
with Competing Human Rights in Pursuit of Indigenous Sovereignty, 24 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
71, 104 (2011) (recognizing Part IVA of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples as an affirmation of Isaiah Berlin’s ideas); Haider Ala Hamoudi, Baghdad
Booksellers, Basra Carpet Merchants, and the Law of God and Man: Legal Pluralism and
Contemporary Muslim Experience, 1 BERK. J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 83 (2008); Thomas
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Berlin and the value pluralists would condone the reestablishment of a
regime of de jure chattel slavery in the name of a non-Enlightenment
legal system. The value pluralists also cling to a core set of morally
acceptable principles, even while allowing an alternative moral and
political system to flourish.46 Yet, the assertions by ISIS are clearly
“counter-enlightenment” claims in the tradition of the phrase that
Berlin famously coined and driven by an articulate alternative moral
vision for achievement of a salient, flourishing life-practice grounded
in a particular view of Islamic history. They establish that value
pluralism is indeed an “empirical fact” in human societies.47 This
Article argues that such claims, even though outlandish and offputting, should be taken in a philosophically serious way and dealt
with head-on. This challenge is actually closely related to the
jurisprudential problem faced by Muslims alluded to earlier because
the value monists will respond to assertions of Islamic permissibility
for slavery and slave-trading simply by asserting that the international
community of jurists and sovereign States should unequivocally reject
the assertion of an Islamic right to own and trade in slaves and take
steps, including military steps, to stamp out those practices. To the
value monists, it does not matter what Islamic jurisprudence has to
say on the issue because slavery and slave trading is such an affront to
all commonly held notions of decency that it must not and cannot be
tolerated.48 If this means that time-honored principles of Islamic
jurisprudence must be sacrificed or abrogated by a consensus of the
larger human community, then so be it. Value pluralists, and those
who recognize the existence of alternative and incommensurate
approaches to moral and political life, would not necessarily go that
Kelly, Unintended Consequences of Legal Westernization in Niger: Harming Contemporary
Slaves by Reconceptualizing Property, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 99 (2008); Ebrahim Moosa, The
Poetics and Politics of Law after Empire: Reading Women’s Rights in Contestations of Law, 1
UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 1 (2001-2002).
46. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 395-99 (1986). Raz’s conception of value
pluralism posits the simultaneous existence of two forms of life, both incommensurate with
each other and both asserting a way to achieve a morally acceptable “good life.” One of the
main attractions of ISIS among Muslims seems to be its promise to provide adherents with a
“good life” in the caliphate. We note that James Madison acknowledged the inevitability of
value pluralism in free societies, “which he saw as the natural consequence of man’s self-love,
passions, the fallibility of his reason, and consequent ‘zeal for different opinions concerning
religion, concerning Government and many other points.’” Sloane, supra note 45, at 1001
n.130 (quoting THE FEDERALIST, NO. 10, at 58-59 (James Madison)).
47. Sloane, supra note 44, at 1005.
48. DWORKIN, supra note 44, at 334.
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far, but they will be hard-pressed to deny the fact that recognition and
continuance of a jurisprudential policy permitting slavery and slave
trading is not good for Islam and will not lead to a recognizable “good
life” for a Muslim community that seeks a place for the Sharīʿah
among the world’s legal systems.
Thirdly, the behavior of ISIS and Boko Haram forces thinking
Muslims and scholars of Islamic law to ask: What coherency remains
of the Islamic legal system? Has the colonialist legacy and the
cabining of Islamic law, sets of events to which ISIS and Boko Haram
clearly seem to be reacting, in fact worked a destruction of Islamic
law, such that it is no longer recognizable as a mature legal system
capable of ordering the lives of its subjects and providing them with a
“good life?” Although we might disagree with their current on-theground policies and styles of governance, are the Muslim insurgencies
acting appropriately and in the best interests of Islamic societies when
they demand the authority to govern Muslim populations by the tenets
of Islamic law, however defined? Answering these questions requires
some understanding of the Salafist tradition in Islamic history.49
49. A full discussion of the history of salafism is beyond the scope of this Article,
although a brief overview will be provided here. The salafist tradition in Islamic discourse is
typically described as beginning with arguments for reform and renewal in Islamic thinking
that commanded widespread attention in the Muslim world at the outset of the twentieth
century. Emad Eldin Shahin, “salafiyah,” in 3 THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN
ISLAMIC WORLD 463 (1995). It is said that the origins of this thinking can be found in the
writings of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and the Egyptian reformer Muhammad ‘Abduh, both of
whom advanced a “modernist” approach to dilemmas presented by European imperialism and
colonial domination of populations in the Muslim world. This “modernist” approach, emulated
by many Muslim intellectuals at the time, exhibited a dualistic character. On the one hand it
emphasized, in powerful terms, a return to the original sources of the understanding and
interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence, the Qur’an and the Sunnah, in ordering the everyday
lives of Muslims. On the other hand it also sought to combat moral decay, disorientation and
lack of confidence among Muslims by championing the compatibility of Islamic thinking with
the best examples of reasoning and scientific knowledge and technology coming out of Europe
and the West. Id. at 465; see also DAVID DEAN COMMINS, ISLAMIC REFORM: POLITICS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATE OTTOMAN SYRIA 66-69 (1990).
While all of this is true, one should not overlook the fact that an emphasis on the primacy
and importance of original scriptural sources is a persistent theme in Islamic scholarly
discourse at least since the time of al-Ghazali. Scholars, jurists and ideologues have
consistently placed particular stress on the scriptural sources when they perceive Islam and the
Muslim community to be under serious assault. One should recall that, during the early
twentieth century rise in Salafist thought, the Ottoman Empire had fallen into its final demise
and the European colonial powers began presiding over the redrawing of the map of the
Middle East and the installation of compliant rulers and officials. During this time,
Muhammad Rashid Rida, a disciple of ‘Abduh, began publishing a magazine, Al Manar (“the
Beacon”), with a widespread readership in the Muslim world, and other writings that
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There are many varieties of Salafism and the Islamic State and Boko
Haram are examples of what is called “revolutionary” or “jihadi”
Salafism, that is, they seek to make war with the perceived enemies of
Islam, establish a caliphate on the model of the ‘Abassid Caliphate of
the eighth century, a territory where all Muslims could live if they
desired, and impose the Islamic law as it existed during those times
on all who reside there.
This Article will explore the questions identified, assessing
Islamic law’s standpoint on slavery and the claims of ISIS and Boko
Haram against the background of the worldwide consensus we have
noted and the relationship between those standpoints and the three
troublesome issues we have pinpointed. In conducting this
assessment, the Article will evaluate the arguments of ideologues for
ISIS and Boko Haram who insist that Islamic law is outside the
consensus on slavery and slave trading that now exists. After
considering the various definitions of slavery, including Islamic law’s
definition, it will critically assess the behaviors of the ISIS and Boko
Haram partisans in light of the veritable explosion of human
trafficking and “modern day slavery” that now predominates as a
result of organized criminal enterprises in many parts of the world
today.50 It will also consider the Islamic legal system’s relationship to
advocated the restoration of the practices of the “pious ancestors,” the salaf al-ṣāliḥ. DANIEL
BROWN, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM 214 (2004). This call was also dualistic because it
advocated the establishment of an Islamic state that would employ modern methods for the
advancement of medical knowledge, religious education, and technological sophistication in
an effort to attain progress for the worldwide Muslim community. See COMMINS, supra note
49, at 130.
Since that time salafism has grown much more complex and varied, with some adherents
eschewing politics while others continuing to vigorously advocate the establishment of an
Islamic state. For a trenchant summary of the major salafist positions, see Bernard Haykel, On
the Nature of Salafi thought and Action, in GLOBAL SALAFISM: ISLAM’S NEW RELIGIOUS
MOVEMENT 33-56 (2014). All salafists agree that living life as the salaf al-ṣāliḥ lived their
lives is the essence of their approach to achieving a flourishing existence but there is
widespread disagreement on how the trappings of modernity should be managed. The
relationship between history and progress is also a highly contested issue. The salafists who
collaborated with and followed Muhammad Rashid Rida placed great emphasis on notions of
progress in human affairs but it appears that the contemporary jihadi-salafists, those who seek
to reestablish the caliphate and their vision of the practices of the salaf al-salih by violent
means, may not see their vision of history as containing notions of progress. Thus, the
reinstitution of de jure slavery and slave-trading thus does not present any moral dilemma for
them.
50. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Trafficking in Persons Report (2015),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245365.pdf; see also UNODC Global Report on
Trafficking in Persons of 2014, UNITED NATIONS 5 (2014), https://www.unodc.
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current juridical efforts to eradicate various forms of slavery and
slave-trading that persist, in spite of the universalistic imperatives
herein described, asking whether this juxtaposition can shed light on
the current coherency and relevance of Islamic law in relation to
slavery and human trafficking.
V. SCHOLARLY DISCOURSE ON SLAVERY AND ISLAM
Assessing the theoretical relationship between Islamic legal
doctrine on slavery and the widely acknowledged consensus
condemning slavery and slavery-related practices is a difficult and
controversial undertaking. Prior to the recent events in Iraq, Syria,
and Nigeria, many scholars took the easy way out and concluded that
the Islamic law on slavery, like the law on slavery in many other
religious legal traditions, is an anachronism and is best ignored as the
world rapidly moves toward a univocal, enlightenment-driven and
unabashedly secular approach to the problem of human exploitation.51
Other scholars have adopted an apologetic stance toward the problem,
as many ordinary Muslims have done, celebrating Islam’s firm
recognition of the humanity of enslaved persons and its strong
exhortations of kind, fair and emancipatory treatment of slaves. The
apologists conclude that any vestiges of the ancient practices that still
exist are benign and should also be ignored.52 Such thinking does not
org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/GLOTIP_2014_full_report.pdf (reporting that human
trafficking affects virtually every country in every region of the world. Between 2010 and
2012, victims with 152 different citizenships were identified in 124 countries across the globe
and at least 510 trafficking flows were identified). The current refugee crisis in Europe appears
to be greatly exacerbating the problem of trafficking. See, e.g., Europe’s Refugee Crisis
Spawns a Billion Dollar Industry, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 9, 2015), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/europe-refugees-smuggling-industry_55ef1426e4b093be51
bc400f.
51. See, e.g., HALLAQ, supra note 4, at 330-31, 335 (arguing that the Islamic law on
slavery, like the law on jihad and “much else in Islamic legal doctrine,” is obsolete and
irrelevant in today’s world).
52. For examples of typical defenses of slavery from an Islamic standpoint, see
ALLAMAH SAYYID SA’EED AKHTAR RIZVI, SLAVERY FROM ISLAMIC AND CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES (1987), http://www.al-islam.org/slavery (arguing “Islam raised the status of
slaves and treated them as human beings instead of brutes of burden (which was their common
lot before Islam)”); The Islamic View on Slaves and Slavery, KHILAFAH.COM (May 13, 2008),
http://www.khilafah.com/index.php/the-khilafah/foreign-policy/2764-the-islamic-view-onslaves-and-slavery (concluding, “it is clear that Islam solved the problem of slavery”); Fadel
Abdallah, Islam, Slavery, and Racism: The Use of Strategy in the Pursuit of Human Rights, 41
THE AM. J. OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL SCIENCES 31 (1987) (“The aim of this article is to use ijtihad,
or informed intellectual effort, to show through textual and historical evidence that Islam, in its
battle for justice, which is identical to human rights, fought against slavery and initiated a
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generate the kind of “rights talk” that would support a regime of
abolition but it does lead to the comforting conclusion that the ideal
Islamic society, in the view of the apologists, is one that would
eventually become slavery-free.
Clearly, neither stance is satisfying. Despite the strong force of
the existing secular consensus, modern day slavery, forced labor, and
human trafficking remain major problems today, in the Muslim world
and elsewhere.53 Muslims around the world still look to their religious
traditions and law for useful approaches to these and other human
rights problems. Yet, many Muslims are now shocked by the
realization that a substantial body of their religious law, law that on
its face appears to condone slavery, might actually be of little use to
them or, more seriously, plainly condemnable and wrong-headed on
the issue. This is a thorny conundrum. On the one hand, concluding
that a substantial body of law, important for one-fifth of the world’s
population, is anachronistic exhibits a head-in-the-sand approach that
is, frankly, counterproductive. On the other hand, concluding that the
Islamic law on slavery might be condemnable and wrong-headed is
also problematic for many Muslims. It is this conclusion, emphasizing
fidelity to religious texts and rules, that is, in part, used by ISIS to
justify reviving the practice. In that vein, Muslims should not be
deluded into believing that blind and uncritical reliance on the
Sharīʿah’s will always lead to successful results in matters involving
human relationships. “Rights talk” is just as important for Muslims as
it is for anyone else. Yet, one should also be well-informed about the
historical examples that opinion-makers, including ISIS opinionmakers, cite in support of their positions. Muslims must therefore
courageously engage the Sharīʿah with critical analysis, thorough and
creative approaches to their legal history, and a clear-eyed realism in
assessing current issues and attitudes if they are to craft lasting
humane and practical plan for its abolition. Only deviation from Islam prevented elimination
of slavery within the first few decades of Islam.”). A similar argument is made by Robert T.
Ware III, Slavery in Islamic Africa, 1400-1800, in THE CAMBRIDGE WORLD HISTORY OF
SLAVERY: VOLUME 3, AD 1420-AD 1804, 78 (David Eltis et al. eds., 2011) (“If abolitionists
sensationalized the exotic, sexual, and brutal aspects of slavery in the Muslim world, most
Islamicists tended to counter the charges by painting slavery in the Muslim world as benign
and paternalistic. In short, they reproduced one kind of Muslim apologetic for slavery.”).
53. See, e.g., Mohamed Y. Mattar, Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, in Countries of the Middle East: The Scope of the Problem and the Appropriate
Legislative Responses, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 721 (2000); see also UNODC Global Report
on Trafficking in Persons of 2014, supra note 50, at 39.
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solutions to contemporary problems in their communities. This
Article seeks to advance this effort in relation to the problem of
slavery in Islamic jurisprudence.
VI. DEFINITIONS
At the outset, it will be useful to define the term “slavery,” as it
is used in this Article, since definitional confusion can obscure
discernment and application of the law, particularly with respect to
the emergence of more recent understandings of what constitutes
slavery. The definition of slavery in Islamic law is remarkably similar
to that found in applicable international law instruments and much
national and municipal law, although the recent recognition of the
concept of “human trafficking” has blurred the international definition
somewhat by focusing on exploitation rather than the ownership
paradigm that characterizes traditional chattel slavery.54 The
recognition of the new crime of “human trafficking” appears to be a
challenge for the Islamic law as well, although there are a number of
Islamic jurisprudential principles and maxims that also condemn
human exploitation.55
Islamic law defines the slave as a human being who is owned by
another human being and is subject to all of the disabilities and
vicissitudes that might be visited on any item of personal property by
its owner or owners.56 Thus, a slave can be bought, sold, gifted,
54. For a widely accepted definition of “human trafficking,” see Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237
U.N.T.S. 000 [hereinafter Palermo Protocol], defining “trafficking in persons” as:
[T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation
shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar
to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
55. See, e.g., Qur’an, supra note 26, 4:75 (supporting the weak in their struggle against
their oppressors and reprimanding those who do not come to the rescue of those who are being
persecuted); see also id. at 4:135 (illustrating the Qur’anic message of justice and
egalitarianism, protecting the weak and vulnerable from exploitation).
56. R. Brunschvig, ‘‘Abd,’ in I ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 24 (H.A.R. Gibb, J.H.
Kramers, E. Levi-Provencal, J. Schacht, eds., 1960); see also Bernard K. Freamon, Definitions
and Conceptions of Slave Ownership in Islamic Law, in THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF
SLAVERY: FROM THE HISTORICAL TO THE CONTEMPORARY 40-60 (Jean Allain ed., 2012). For
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mortgaged, leased, loaned, pledged, used or even destroyed, in the
same way as any other piece of owned personal property might be.57
The slave is therefore subject to the absolute will and total control of
the slaveholder. In the classical Islamic legal texts the rules governing
the ownership and disposal of slaves made frequent analogy to similar
rules governing the ownership and disposal of livestock.58 Despite
this rather straightforward definition in Islamic law, there were many
forms of slavery in Islamic practice that did not neatly fit the strictly
‟chattel” conception of slavery. The Qur’an unequivocally recognizes
the humanity of the slave.59 Slaves functioned as soldiers and even as
military commanders and they performed other important tasks in
medieval and early modern Islamic governments—tasks which
sometimes gave them extraordinary control over large amounts of
public and private wealth as well as other human beings and
important decision-making functions of organs of government and the
religious establishment.60 Given this practice and given the emphasis
the definition as expressed by the jurists in Arabic, see, e.g., 23 AL-MAWSU’AH AL-FIQHIYAH,
11-12 (2nd ed. 1992) (stating that a slave is one who is owned by another).
57. See ‘Abd, supra note 56 (“On the juridico-religious level, the slave has a kind of
composite quality, partaking of the nature both of thing and of person. Considered as a thing,
he is subject to the right of ownership—-indeed it is in this that the strict definition of slavery
lies—-exercised by a man or a woman, and he may be the object of all the legal operations
proceeding from this position: sale, gift, hire, inheritance and so on. In this respect he is a
‘mere commodity’ (sil’a min al-sila’).”). ’
58. IBN RUSHD, THE DISTINGUISHED JURIST’S PRIMER, A TRANSLATION OF BIDAYAT
AL-MUJTAHID II 208-211 (Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee trans., 1994); ‘Abd, supra note 56 (“In
the various classes of property distinguished by the fikh, he generally ranks with the animals
and his lot is like theirs: the new-born slave, for instance, is the ‘fruit’ (ghalla) of his mother,
like the young of cattle and belongs to her master. . . .”).
59. Perhaps the two best examples of this recognition are the verses mandating equality
of punishment for homicide, Qur’an, supra note 26, 2:178-9, and the verse exhorting Muslims
to marry believing slaves rather than unbelieving free persons. Id. at 2:221.
60. See, e.g., ABU’L-HASAN ‘ALI IBN MUHAMMAD IBN HABI AL-BASRI AL-BAGHDADI
AL-MAWARDI, AL-AHKAM AS-SULTANIYYAH: THE LAWS OF ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE 98-99
(Asadullah Yate trans., 1996) (discussing slaves serving as ‘executive wazirs,’ as well as
leading prayer); see also IBN RUSHD, THE DISTINGUISHED JURIST’S PRIMER: A TRANSLATION
OF BIDAYAT AL-MUJTAHID II 13 (Imran Khan Nyazee trans., 1994) (reporting that Abu Hanifa
permitted slaves to serve as guardians in marriage); Mohammed Bashir Salau, Slaves in a
Muslim City: A Survey of Slavery in Nineteenth Century Kano, in SLAVERY, ISLAM AND
DIASPORA 99 n.7 (Behnaz A. Mirzai et al. eds., 2009) (citing SEAN STILWELL, THE KANO
MAMLUKS: ROYAL SLAVERY IN THE SOKOTO CALIPHATE, 1807-1903, (1999) (Ph.D.
dissertation, York University)) (discussing the role of slaves working in the Kano palace in
“domestic and emirate administration, army service, and security”); EHUD R. TOLEDANO,
SLAVERY AND ABOLITION IN THE OTTOMAN MIDDLE EAST 24-53 (1998) (discussing kul-type,
or military-administrative servitude, and harem slavery existing in nineteenth century Ottoman
society, as well as the presence of African eunuchs in the nineteenth century); JANE
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on the emancipation of the slave in the religious texts, jurists
frequently and regularly recognized the humanity of the slave in their
opinions and gave it great importance.61 Yet, despite this strong
humanitarian emphasis, the idea of “ownership by another”’ remained
the sin qua non of slavery in Islamic law and practice.62
The definition of slavery in international law similarly revolves
around the concept of ownership. Although some States in the early
twentieth century sought to include “slavery-like practices,” such as
corvee labor, forced marriages, and disguised child adoptions within
the definition of slavery, other States, especially the colonial and
former colonial powers, resisted this effort and, in 1926, the
international community settled on a widely agreed-upon definition,
expressed in the 1926 Slavery Convention of the League of Nations.63
Although the political process that resulted in the Convention was
fraught with controversy and contention created by the competing
interests previously described, the definition that emerged became a
firm international normative standard, defining slavery as “the status
or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching
to the right of ownership are exercised.”64 All international legal

HATHAWAY, BESHIR AGHA: CHIEF EUNUCH OF THE OTTOMAN IMPERIAL HAREM (2005)
(describing the life of a powerful African Ottoman eunuch).
61. MONA SIDDIQUI, THE GOOD MUSLIM: REFLECTIONS ON CLASSICAL ISLAMIC LAW
AND THEOLOGY 36-66 (2012).
62. A commonly heard word in Arabic, used to describe a slave, is ‘mamlūk,’ which
literally means “one who is owned.” Joel Quirk has pointed out that the purpose of slavery is
not always commercial exploitation. Slaves are often held to accomplish other goals, such as
“prestige, consumption, warfare, or reproduction” and sometimes for “sadistic” purposes or to
psychosocially elevate the status of one population over another, as was the case in Nazi
Germany. Joel Quirk, Defining Slavery in all its Forms: Historical Inquiry as Contemporary
Instruction, in THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY, supra note 56, at 253-77; see also
Freamon, Definitions and Conceptions of Slave Ownership in Islamic Law, supra note 56, at
47 (citing ‘malaka,’ in HANNA E. KASSIS, A CONCORDANCE OF THE QUR’AN 765-67 n.30
(1983)) (noting “that the most common usage of the word malaka (in the property sense) in the
Qur’an is in its discussion of slaves, including concubines, and captives in war, who were
often enslaved after hostilities”).
63. International Convention with the Object of Securing the Abolition of Slavery and the
Slave Trade, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253; see also Jean Allain, The Definition of Slavery
in International Law, 52 HOW. L.J. 239 (2009) (describing the resistance to a wider definition
by the colonial and former colonial powers); JEAN ALLAIN, THE SLAVERY CONVENTIONS:
THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE 1926 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONVENTION AND THE
1956 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION (2008).
64. International Convention with the Object of Securing the Abolition of Slavery and the
Slave Trade, supra note 63, art. 1, ¶ 1; see also LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY, supra
note 56, at 207-9 (discussing the legislative history of the 1926 Slavery Convention).
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instruments purporting to define slavery promulgated since then have
largely clung to the essence of the 1926 definition.65
In 1982, the sociologist Orlando Patterson offered an alternative
definition of slavery that came to be very influential. In his book,
Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study, Patterson argued
that slaves are not always commercial chattel in the capitalist sense
and ownership, in the legal sense, may not always be the sin qua non
of slavery. Consistent with this approach, Patterson has argued that
slavery always consists of three distinct markers: (1) personal
corporeal domination that is enforced by actual or threatened physical
or psychological violence; (2) ‟natal alienation” of the slave and, in
more recent times, profound socio-cultural isolation; and (3)
degradation attached to the slave status, which gives expression to the
idea that the slave is a person without honor or dignity, with no means
of redress for injury to these typically human attributes.66
Although legal fictions were sometimes put forward to justify
the capture and enslavement of innocents in such circumstances, the
commercial practice of trading in slaves, prevalent in the Muslim
world, remained largely outside the purview of the Islamic law. Slave
trading is not mentioned in the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad
actually condemned the capture and sale of free persons.67 After his
death, however, the demands of empire caused jurists to look the
other way, ignoring the immorality of what was essentially an illegal
65. See, e.g., Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institution of
Practices Similar to Slavery, Supplementary to the International Convention, Sept. 7, 1956,
266 U.N.T.S. 3 (stating “‘Slavery’ means, as defined in the Slavery Convention of 1926, the
status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership are exercised, and ‘slave’ means a person in such condition or status . . . ”); see also
Jean Allain & Robin Hickey, Property and the Definition of Slavery, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
915, 915-38 (2012).
66. See ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY, Part I (1982); see also Patterson’s more recent writing: FREEDOM IN THE MAKING OF
WESTERN CULTURE (later renamed 1 FREEDOM: FREEDOM IN THE MAKING OF WESTERN
CULTURE) (1991); RITUALS OF BLOOD: CONSEQUENCES OF SLAVERY IN TWO AMERICAN
CENTURIES (1999); Helotic Slavery and Freedom, in NINO LURAGHI & SUSAN E. ALCOCK,
HELOTS AND THEIR MASTERS IN LACONIA AND MESSENIA (2003); The Ancient and Medieval
Origins of Modern Freedom, in THE PROBLEM OF EVIL, 31-66 (John Stouffer & Steven Mintz
eds., 2006); Freedom, Slavery, and the Modern Construction of Rights, in THE CULTURAL
VALUES OF EUROPE 115-51 (Hans Joas & Klaus Wiegandt eds., 2008); Orlando Patterson,
Trafficking, Gender and Slavery: Past and Present, in ALLAIN, supra note 56, at 322-59.
67. Selected Hadith Regarding [Yawm ul-Qiyamah (The Day of Resurrection), (Day of
Judgment)], Sahih Bukhari, Vol. 3, Book 34: Sales and Trade, Hadith No. 329, THE MESSAGE
CONVEYED, https://blackbunker9.wordpress.com/2013/03/28/selected-hadith-regarding-yawm
-ul-qiyamah-the-day-of-resurrection-day-of-judgment/.
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trade, and permitting their patrons to get rich on the traffic in human
beings.68 Even after imposition of colonial and post-colonial de jure
provisions abolishing slavery and the slave trades in the Muslim
world, the trafficking in human beings that originated in the preIslamic and Muslim slave trades in the Indian Ocean, across the
Sahara, and across Eurasia continued. Colonial governments in these
regions and their Muslim-led successors often found the need to
import large numbers of persons from poorer regions to satisfy their
labor needs.69 The legal history of the international antislavery
movement tells us that trafficking in human beings in the Middle East
and the Indian Ocean worlds never ceased. Eventually, international
organizations, and in recent times, national governments sought fresh
approaches to this problem, describing the phenomena as “modern
day slavery” or “international human trafficking.” It may very well be
that the Islamic jurisprudence has not kept pace with this
development. A salafist vision of war and slavery and slave trading
also may not enable a competent and effective understanding of this
history. It is crucial, therefore, that we craft an effective legal history
of the practice of slavery in Islam.70
68. Research documenting the accumulation of wealth by slave-traders in the Middle
East and the Indian Ocean world, particularly for the early period of the slave trades, is still in
its infancy but historians have begun to mine the sources documenting the trade in the 19th
century and there is significant evidence of great wealth derived from the slave trades,
especially in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea economies. See, e.g., Thomas M. Ricks, Slaves and
Slave Trades in the Persian Gulf, 18th and 19th Centuries: An Assessment, in THE ECONOMICS
OF THE INDIAN OCEAN SLAVE TRADE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 60, 68 (William Gervase
Clarence-Smith, ed. 1989) (noting great wealth generated by the slave trade); Janet J. Ewald,
The Nile Valley System and Red Sea Slave Trade: 1820-1880, in id. at 71, 82; William Gervase
Clarence-Smith, The Economics of the Indian Ocean and Red Sea Slave Trades in the 19th
Century: An Overview, in id. at 1, 8 (same); MATTHEW S. HOPPER, SLAVES OF ONE MASTER:
GLOBALIZATION AND SLAVERY IN ARABIA IN THE AGE OF EMPIRE, 80 (2015) (describing a
boom in wealth on the Arabian Peninsula from an explosion in the pearling and date farming
industries and the African contribution to this “fantastic wealth”).
69. Jane J. Ewald, Crossers of the Sea: Slaves, Freedmen, and other Migrants in the
Northwestern Indian Ocean, c. 1750-1914, 105 THE AM. HIST. REV. 69, 69-91 (2000); Adam
McKeown, Global Migration 1846-1940, 15 J. OF WORLD HIST. 155, 155-89 (2004); Barry
Chiswick & Timothy J. Hatton, International Migration and the Integration of Labor Markets,
in GLOBALIZATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 65-120 (Michael D. Bordo et al. eds.,
2003).
70. In the section that follows, I will attempt to employ the concept of an “effective
history” developed by the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD 266 (G. Barden and J. Cummins, trans. and eds., 1975). Gadamer
posited that the social sciences, including history, are hampered in achieving an understanding
of events because they do not effectively deal with the influence of prejudices and biases
inherent in the tradition that produces the social science. The typical approach is to strive for
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VII. ISLAMIC LAW AND SLAVERY: CRAFTING AN EFFECTIVE
LEGAL HISTORY
The normative system now commonly referred to as the
Sharīʿah did not develop as rapidly as is sometimes assumed. It took
about 400 years for that system to develop into a mature and firm
basis of sound juridical policy, legal decision-making and
jurisprudential thought.71 The starting point of the development of this
basis was, of course, the Qur’an. The text comprises revelations
communicated to the Prophet Muhammad in a variety of
circumstances and situations over a twenty-three year period,
beginning in 610 C.E. and concluding in 632 C.E., shortly before his
death. Although the Qur’an is much more than a law code or
legislative guide, it became the primary source of the Sharīʿah.72
There was acceptance of slavery in the document, but also there were
assertions of a new ethic that should govern the relationship of human
beings with each other and with the universe around them.73
The Qur’an was not the only source of rules for the development
of law and ethics among Muslims. During the time the Prophet was
alive and within the first few generations after his death, a normative
life-practice emerged, based on reports of the perceived behavior of
the Prophet and his pronouncements, as interpreted and remembered
by his companions. These companions included the first four caliphs,
an “objective” understanding of texts and events when this is practically impossible. He saw
the relationship between texts and their interpreters as a dynamic and fluid process. In history,
in his view, there is a dialectical relationship between reason and tradition that greatly
influences understandings of historical events. He argued that the interpreter should struggle
for a “reflective self-awareness” that will lead to an “effective historical consciousness.” This
consciousness will greatly assist the interpreter in achieving a usable or “effective”
understanding of history. Without reflective and dynamic self-awareness on the part of the
interpreter, understanding becomes illusory and often times false. These concepts are
explained nicely and I have borrowed some of this account from Wilfred Carr, Philosophy,
Method and Action Research, 40 J. OF THE PHIL. OF ED. 421, 429-32 (2006). For background
on Gadamer’s life and work see William Outhwaite, Hans-Georg Gadamer, in THE RETURN
OF THE GRAND THEORY IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES (Quentin Skinner, ed., 1985).
71. WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES: AN INTRODUCTION
TO SUNNI USUL AL-FIQH 2-3 (1997); WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
ISLAMIC LAW 122-77 (2005) (describing the development of Islamic legal theories and
methodologies of jurisprudence and the formation of the “schools of law”); N.J. COULSON, A
HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 36-63 (1994) (similarly describing the development of legal
institutions and particularly describing the influence of Imam Muhammad Idris al-Shafi’i).
72. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 16-57 (3rd
rev. and enl. ed., 2003).
73. See generally TOSHIHIKO IZUTSU, ETHICO-RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS IN THE QUR’AN
(2002).
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who effectively functioned as lawgivers in the new Islamic political
and imperial entity that emerged. The new normative life-practice
also drew lessons from the behavior and pronouncements of the
companions.74 There is great controversy over whether this normative
life-practice can be traced directly back to the Prophet or whether it
was invented by historians, jurists, and political leaders coming after
him who had an interest in establishing a normative standard of
behavior for denizens in the new empire.75 For our purposes,
ascertaining the source of this normative standard does not matter
because it is undisputed that slavery was an integral part of the new
life-practice, no matter who defined it or what its source. Common
conceptions of slavery and its place in the new legal culture similarly
transcended the Sunni-Shi’a divide that developed soon after the
death of Ali, the fourth Caliph and the Prophet’s son-in-law, although
it has been argued that the Shi’a, beginning with Ali, were more
liberal in their treatment of slaves and took the pious obligation of
emancipation more seriously.76 Nonetheless, both Sunni Muslims and
Shi’a Muslims practiced slavery and slave trading in very similar
ways, with differences largely confined to details.77
When the first revelations of the Qur’an came to the Prophet
Muhammad in 610 C.E., chattel slavery was an accepted aspect of life
and the legal culture in the Middle East and in most of the Eurasian
and African world. Given this milieu, it would have been very
difficult, socio-legally and economically, for the Prophet Muhammad
to have sought the complete abolition of slavery. Indeed the Qur’an
accepts chattel slavery as a fact of social, economic and juridical life,
74. The accounts of the life-practice we have described are called ahadith, which is the
plural of the word hadith, meaning “story” or “report” or “account.” The hadith literature is
voluminous. Good general descriptions of the literature, its development, and its place as a
source of law in the Islamic legal system can be found in HADITH: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENTS (Harold Motzki, ed., 2004); JONATHAN A.C. BROWN, HADITH:
MUHAMMAD’S LEGACY IN THE MEDIEVAL AND MODERN WORLD (2009); MOHAMMAD
HASHIM KAMALI, A TEXTBOOK OF HADITH STUDIES: AUTHENTICITY, COMPILATION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND CRITICISM OF HADITH (2006).
75. See JOSEPH SCHACHT, THE ORIGINS OF MUHAMMADAN JURISPRUDENCE, 138-51
(1950). For discussion of Schacht’s theses, see N.J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW
(1999); Wael B. Hallaq, From Fatwa to Furu: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive
Law, in 1 ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY, 29-65 (1994); THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
ISLAMIC LAW, supra note 71, at 102-9.
76. CLARENCE-SMITH, supra note 40, at 55-56 (asserting that Ali’s son Husayn and
grandson Zayn al-Abidin liberated many slaves and that Ja’far al-Sadiq, the eponym of a major
Shi’a school of law, preached against slavery).
77. Id. at 56.
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although the revelations from God do manifest a great concern for the
welfare of slaves—frequently exhorting kind treatment and
emancipation and laying down an important analogy comparing the
master-slave relationship with the relationship between God and
human.78 Similarly, the Prophet Muhammad exhibited a great
solicitude for the material and spiritual condition of slaves in the
society around him. It is said that his example inspired his
companions to emancipate thousands of slaves in the early days of the
Islamic project.79 Yet, the Prophet Muhammad never spoke of
abolition and he owned, gave and received slaves throughout his life
and even used slavery as an instrument of conquest in war.80
As was suggested in the previous section, the Islamic project
spawned by the Qur’anic revelations and the example of the Prophet’s
life gave rise over the next millennium to a series of powerful empires
that extended from Andalusia in Spain and Morocco in the west to
India and Southeast Asia in the east and from the Balkans, Turkey,
the Caucasus Mountains, the Hindu Kush, and the Asian Steppes in
the north and northeast to what is today Nigeria in the southwest and
Tanzania, Zanzibar, and the Comoros Islands in the southeast.81 In all

78. See Qur’an, supra note 26, 16:71-75; for verses exhorting kind treatment, see, e.g.,
id. 2:221; 4:36; 9:60; 16:71-75; 24:32; for verses encouraging emancipation, see, e.g., id.
2:177; 4:25; 4:92; 5:89; 14:31; 24:33; 58:3; 90:1-20. This footnote draws from the author’s
earlier research and writing on this issue. See discussion of Qur’anic verses and Hadith in
Bernard Freamon, Slavery, Freedom, and the Doctrine of Consensus in Islamic Jurisprudence,
11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 34-53 (1998); see also Mirza, supra note 42, at 4-5.
79. ABDUL ALI, INSIGHTS INTO ISLAMIC HUMANISM: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH,
79 (2007) (noting that Abdullah bin ‘Umar and Abdul Rahman bin ‘Awf freed one thousand
and thirty thousand slaves, respectively, and that Hakim bin Hazzam, on the day Mecca was
conquered, liberated another one hundred slaves to celebrate his conversion to Islam).
80. See JONATHAN BROCKOPP, EARLY MALIKI LAW: IBN ‘ABD AL-HAKAM AND HIS
MAJOR COMPENDIUM OF JURISPRUDENCE 140 n.89 (2000) (arguing that the Prophet
Muhammad was surrounded by at least 12 slaves during his lifetime, including Bilal ibn
Rabah, Zayd ibn Harith, and Salman al-Farisi); ARENT JAN WENSINCK & WOLFGANG H.
BEHN, MUHAMMAD AND THE JEWS OF MEDINA (1975); W. MONTGOMERY WATT,
MUHAMMAD AT MEDINA 397 (1994) (Excursus C); see also supra note 33 and accompanying
text (describing the account of the enslavement of the women and children of the Banu
Quraydha).
81. See generally 2 MARSHALL G.S. HODGSON, THE VENTURE OF ISLAM (1974); IRA M.
LAPIDUS, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC SOCIETIES (3rd ed. 2014); HALIL INALCIK, THE OTTOMAN
EMPIRE 1300-1600 (2013); MURRAY LAST, THE SOKOTO CALIPHATE (1967); HUGH
KENNEDY, WHEN BAGHDAD RULED THE MUSLIM WORLD: THE RISE AND FALL OF ISLAM’S
GREATEST DYNASTY (2006); RICHARD M. EATON, THE RISE OF ISLAM AND THE BENGAL
FRONTIER: 1204-1760 (1993); JAMES FRANCIS WARREN, THE SULU ZONE: THE WORLD
CAPITALIST ECONOMY AND THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION (1998); STEPHEN F. DALE, THE
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of these empires and in all of the places touched by the Islamic
project, slavery remained the norm and large numbers of slaves were
supplied to the denizens of those realms, and to Arab and Persian
communities in the Islamic heartland, through a robust and
commercially successful system of slave trading and transport.82 As
has been noted, this massive regime of slave trading, often fueled by
plunder and conquest, was actually illegal under the Sharīʿah, but the
illegality of the enterprise was largely ignored by its participants,
financiers, and the jurists. Slave trading and the trafficking in human
beings over the seas and across deserts, with all its horrific cruelty
and massive loss of life, continued with impunity for over one
thousand years.83
From what source or sources, then, would one draw the
conclusion that the religion of Islam and Islamic law stand for the
right of freedom from slavery? The reader should now see why
finding a right of freedom from slavery in the traditional Islamic
sources is a difficult undertaking. There are numerous texts in the
MUSLIM EMPIRES OF THE OTTOMANS, SAFAVIDS AND MUGHALS (2009); J.S. TRIMINGHAM,
ISLAM IN EAST AFRICA (1964).
82. See generally PAUL E. LOVEJOY, TRANSFORMATIONS IN SLAVERY: A HISTORY OF
SLAVERY IN AFRICA 88-90 (3d ed. 2012) (describing Muslim trading networks for the
transportation and distribution of African slaves throughout Arabia, the Ottoman Empire or the
Indian Ocean basin); see also THE SLAVE TRADE INTO ARABIA (Anita L.P. Burdett, ed. 2006);
M. Abir, The Ethiopian Slave Trade and its Relation to the Islamic World, in SLAVES AND
SLAVERY IN MUSLIM AFRICA (J.R. Willis, ed. 1985); SLAVERY AND SOUTH ASIAN HISTORY
(Richard M. Eaton and Indrani Chatterjee, eds. 2006).
83. See generally REGINALD COUPLAND, EAST AFRICA AND ITS INVADERS FROM ITS
EARLIEST TIMES TO THE DEATH OF SAYYID SAID IN 1856 (1938); REGINALD COUPLAND, THE
EXPLOITATION OF EAST AFRICA 1856-1890: THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE SCRAMBLE (1939);
RONALD SEGAL, ISLAM’S BLACK SLAVES: THE OTHER BLACK DIASPORA (2001); JOHN
WRIGHT, THE TRANS-SAHARAN SLAVE TRADE (2007); BERNARD LEWIS, RACE AND SLAVERY
IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN HISTORICAL ENQUIRY (1990); MURRAY GORDON, SLAVERY IN THE
ARAB WORLD (1989); WARREN, supra note 81; LOVEJOY, supra note 82. See also Gwyn
Campbell, Slavery and the Trans-Indian Ocean World Slave Trade: A Historical Outline, in
CROSS CURRENTS AND COMMUNITY NETWORKS: THE HISTORY OF THE INDIAN OCEAN
WORLD 286 (Himanshu Prabha Ray and Edward A. Alpers, eds. 2007); MOHAMMED ENNAJI,
SLAVERY, THE STATE AND ISLAM (2013); EVE TROUTT-POWELL, TELL THIS IN MY MEMORY:
STORIES OF ENSLAVEMENT FROM EGYPT, SUDAN, AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (2012); RACE
AND SLAVERY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: HISTORIES OF TRANS-SAHARAN AFRICANS IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY EGYPT, SUDAN AND THE OTTOMAN MEDITERRANEAN (Terence Walz
and Kenneth M. Cuno, eds. 2010); 1 WOMEN AND SLAVERY: AFRICA, THE INDIAN OCEAN
AND THE MEDIEVAL NORTH ATLANTIC (Gwyn Campbell, Suzanne Miers, and Joseph C.
Miller eds., 2007); EHUD R. TOLEDANO, AS IF SILENT BUT ABSENT: BONDS OF
ENSLAVEMENT IN THE ISLAMIC MIDDLE EAST (2007); THE HUMAN COMMODITY:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE TRANS-SAHARAN SLAVE TRADE (Elizabeth Savage ed., 1992).
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Qur’an and Sunnah, which unequivocally posit the legality of slavery
under certain conditions. There is also a vast corpus of juristic opinion
that assumes, without questioning its morality, the legality of slavery
in Islamic communities in a great variety of circumstances.
Discovering the existence of a right to be free from slavery in what
appears to be a pro-slavery textual thicket therefore requires a careful,
detailed and critical examination of the sources, the principles of
jurisprudence and law that are derived from them, and the legal
history of juristic efforts to interpret them. There is an inexplicable
tendency, particularly among modernist Muslim thinkers, to
uncritically conclude that Islamic law would support an outright
abolition of slavery and slave trading.84 This is not necessarily so.
Tellingly, these thinkers are at a loss to explain why abolition was not
readily embraced by Muslim jurists, scholars and government
officials when they were confronted with such demands by nineteenth
and twentieth century European colonial officials and Christian
missionaries. In point of fact, during the heyday of the nineteenth and
early twentieth century European-led campaigns against slavery, there
was strong resistance to abolition in religious circles and widely held
public opinion among Muslims supporting the right to own slaves.85
These attitudes eventually changed but, more troubling, recent fairly
well-regarded and widely circulated juristic opinions in the
contemporary Muslim world, consistent with the foundational texts
previously described, still argue that Islamic law permits heads of
Muslim governments to authorize the enslavement of prisoners of war
captured in a jihad against unbelievers.86 The ISIS ideologues do not
84. See, e.g., FARHAD MALEKIAN, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: A COMPARATIVE SEARCH 229 (2d ed., 2011) (“According to the legal, social, economic
and political philosophy of Islamic international criminal law mankind is equal in all social
phenomena. Islamic jurisdiction therefore prohibits any type of action degrading a person to
the statute of slavery.”).
85. See CLARENCE-SMITH, supra note 40, at 140-42; see also Amal Ghazal, Debating
Slavery in the Arab Middle East: Abolition between Muslim Reformers and Conservatives, in
ISLAM, SLAVERY AND DIASPORA 139-153 (Behnaz Mirzai Asl et al. eds. 2009).
86. The Wisdom behind the Legality of Slavery, in 5 FATAWA ISLAMIYAH [ISLAMIC
VERDICTS], 96-99 (2002) (collecting the opinions of Shaykh ‘Abdul-’Aziz bin ‘Abdullah bin
Baz, Shaykh Muhammad bin Salih Al-’Uthaimin, and Shaykh ‘Abdullah bin ‘Abdur-Rahman
Al-Jibreen). The fatwa argues that slavery should remain lawful because its purpose is to
“reform those enslaved by removing them from an evil environment, and allowing them to live
in a Muslim society [which will] guide them to the path of goodness, save them from the
clutches of evil, purify them from the filth of disbelief and misguidance, and make them
deserving of a life of freedom. . . .” See also Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani, Hadith
Commentary: Slavery in Islam, DEOBAND (Jan. 26 2013), http://www.deoband.org/2013/
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rely on these modern opinions but cite instead to verses in the Qur’an
text in reported ahadith, and juristic opinions from early Islam that
support the lawfulness of chattel slavery and clearly lay down rules
governing relationships with slaves. The ISIS ideologues and their
Boko Haram compatriots are particularly fond of citing those
provisions of the Qur’an and Hadith that authorize sexual relations
with concubines.87 Their outsized fondness for these provisions is an
important fact and we shall return to it at the end of this Article.
It may come as some relief to the reader that questions with
respect to the legality of involuntary servitude and forced labor in
Islamic law are relatively easier to answer. Islamic textual sources
and juristic opinions clearly recognize a free person’s right to freedom
from subjection to involuntary servitude and forced labor.88 It is clear,
however, that an argument for the assertion of a freedom from slavery
based on core Islamic texts and the legal history of their interpretation
does not flow as easily using conventional and traditionalist sources.
If an Islamic jurist uses conventional and traditionalist sources and
methods of analysis, he or she will likely conclude that slavery, under
certain conditions, is allowable in a jurisdiction governed by the
Sharīʿah and perhaps even necessary, much like the jurists concluded
in the excerpt quoted in footnote 86 above.
This Article does not share this view. In light of events that have
occurred in Islamic legal and imperial history, and the evolution in the
role of slavery in human history, it will strike a contrary note. Many
01/hadith/hadith-commentary/slavery-in-islam/ (“Thus, the clear manifest truth is that taking
slaves is permissible in Islam, with its laws and its limits which have preceded, and nothing
has abrogated it, and there are wisdoms in this which we have explained, and the opinion of its
abrogation is rejected and is against consensus, and has no proof from the proofs of the
Shari’ah.”).
87. Concubines are often described by using the Arabic idiomatic expression ma malakat
aymanukum (“those who your right hands possess”). This phrase is one of several forms used
in the Qur’an to describe war captives and others who may fall into a state of enslavement as a
result of hostilities, negotiations between belligerents, or as tribute or war booty flowing from
one group to another. One of the best-known examples of the use of this phrase is found at
verse 4:24, where men are permitted to have sexual relations with “those whom their right
hands possess. . . .” For a thorough review of the status of concubines in Islamic law see
Marion H. Katz, Concubinage, in Islamic Law, BRILL ONLINE (Oct. 2, 2015, 7:48 p.m.),
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3/concubinage-in-islamic
-law-COM_25564.
88. The most frequently cited are the Qur’anic provisions condemning the imposition of
a regime of forced labor on the Jewish people by the Egyptian Pharaoh and a hadith reporting
that the Prophet Muhammad condemned employers who refused to pay wages to their
workers. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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years ago, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, the widely cited law
professor and legal scholar, called for an effort by jurists to show how
slavery might be abolished in Islamic law, using an internal point of
view.89 This Article will explicate how such an abolitionary
conclusion can be reached by taking a fresh and dynamic approach to
the sources and by examining the legal history through a new lens.
This new lens, employing an expansion of the “internal point of
view,” will view Islamic legal history as a critical part of world
history, a history that now recognizes slavery and slave trading as a
jurisprudential negative. In the words of Justice Story, it “…stirs up
the worst passions of the human soul, darkening the spirit of revenge,
sharpening the greediness of avarice, brutalizing the selfish,
envenoming the cruel, famishing the weak, and crushing to death the
broken-hearted.”90 Muslim jurists conveniently ignored these
negatives, so as to further their patrons’ imperialistic ends, even
though the sources would authorize the recognition that the negative
should not be permitted to exist. The analysis expressed in this Article
will also show that the view expressed by the ISIS ideologues and
their Boko Haram compatriots is in fact a false and historically
inaccurate view, one based on an imperialistic lens that developed on
slavery after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Even if one accepts
the literalist view of the sources championed by ISIS and many
salafists, it still appears that there is now a jurisprudential basis for the
elimination of slavery and slave trading in Muslim communities.
A. Finding a Jurisprudential Basis for the Abolition of Slavery in the
Qur’an and Sunnah
There are a considerable number of references in the Qur’an
directly acknowledging the social and physical presence of chattel
slaves in the society and seeking to regulate their condition, their legal
status or their relationship to freedom.91 As noted earlier, there are

89. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL
LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 175 (1990).
90. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. (No. 15,551) 832, 845 (C.C.D. Mass., 1832); see also
ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 100-16
(1975).
91. By my count there are at least 30 direct references, using various linguistic forms of
description. See, e.g., Qur’an, supra note 26, 2:177, 2:178, 2:221 (twice), 4:3, 4:24, 4:25, 4:36,
4:92 (three times), 5:89, 9:60, 23:6, 24:31, 24:32, 24:33, 24:58, 30:28, 33:50, 33:52 33:55,
70:30. For a more detailed discussion of the Qur’anic linguistic forms of description of
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passages where the concept of chattel slavery and the existence of the
master-slave relationship in human affairs are used in the
metaphorical sense, illustrating the nature of the relationship between
God and humankind, and the abject dependence of the human being
on the will of God.92 Franz Rosenthal noted that ar-Raghib al-Isfahani
(ca. 1100), in his Qur’an dictionary, first defined ḥurr [to be free] as
the opposite of ‘abd [to be a slave], and then distinguished two forms
of ḥurriyya [freedom]: “the one referring to the person who is not
subject to any authority, and the other to the person who is not
dominated by any ugly qualities as greed and the desire for worldly
possessions.”93
To illustrate the first form of ḥurriyya, Al-Isfahani referred to
the Qur’an’s homicide legislation, at 2:178-9, which abolished the
vendetta and blood feud as a remedy for homicide and substituted an
egalitarian approach to capital punishment, ordering that punishment
should be meted out according to a regime of rough equality, “the free
for the free” (al ḥurr bi-l-ḥurr), “the woman for the woman” and “the
slave for the slave” (al ‘abd bi-l-’abd). He also pointed to the
Qur’anic use of the term tḥrīr, at, for instance, 4:92/94, which means
to “liberate” or “free” the slave from his or her shackles. For the
second meaning, he proposed an interpretation of muḥarrar at 3:35/31
(“where the mother of Moses is said to have dedicated the child in her
womb to God muḥarraran”) as meaning “free from worldly
desires.”94
It is the former use of ḥurr that predominates in the Qur’an and
the great bulk of the Qur’anic discussion of slavery is, therefore,
concerned with practical problems involving the treatment of slaves,
their relationships to free persons and circumstances governing their
emancipation. Even though there is considerable regulation of the
relation between the free and the enslaved, there are no verses
suggesting that the practice of slavery ought to continue and there is
virtually no discussion of slave trading. Yet, one also looks in vain for
an explicit statement mandating the end of the practice.
slavery, see Brockopp, supra note 74, at 128-38; see also Definitions and Conceptions of Slave
Ownership in Islamic Law, supra note 56, at 49-52.
92. See, e.g., Qur’an, supra note 26, 16:71-75.
93. FRANZ ROSENTHAL, THE MUSLIM CONCEPT OF FREEDOM PRIOR TO THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 24 (1960) (citing Ar-Raghib al-Isfahani, al-Mufradat fi gharib alQur’an, I 109 f., n.54, (1324)).
94. Id.
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Drawing conclusions concerning a Qur’anic view of abolition,
therefore, requires the interpreter to look carefully at the larger social,
philosophical and jurisprudential themes expressed in the Qur’an to
see whether these assertions could support a contemporary regime of
abolition that would be consonant and compatible with other
provisions of the Qur’an and Sunnah and the Sharīʿah as a whole.
The reader should bear in mind that a traditionalist interpretation
would conclude that slavery is lawful in Islam simply because there is
Qur’anic legislation regulating it, which is an implied permission, and
“just as one may not permit what God forbids, so one may not forbid
what God permits.”95 Even the traditionalists must acknowledge,
however, that all of the Qur’anic verses on slavery are situated in a
context that overwhelmingly encourages emancipation. It must be
said, then, that the Qur’an seeks to establish an emancipatory ethic on
the issue of slavery. The revelations overwhelmingly emphasize
emancipation of slaves and not the capture of slaves or the
continuation of the institutions of slavery and slave trading. For
example, verse 2:177 counsels believers to eschew blind adherence to
religious ritual and to cleave to moral and pious behaviors, such as the
emancipation of slaves, particularly in times of stress and adversity.
Verse 4:25 establishes a basic juridical incompatibility between
slavery and marriage. In the Islamic era marriage, then, became an
important emancipatory vehicle for women living in concubinal
circumstances. Verses 4:92, 5:89 and 58:3 mandate the freeing of a
slave as expiation for a variety of transgressions including sins,
crimes, or other prohibited behaviors, such as the intentional violation
of the Ramadan fast. Verse 24:33 orders the owners of slaves to
respect requests by slaves to pay for their freedom by contract of
manumission. If the slave sought to be emancipated by contract the
owner was strongly urged to give his or her consent absent
extenuating circumstances. Although the Qur’anic verse appears to
impose a mandatory obligation on the owner to allow emancipation
by contract, the near unanimous juristic interpretation of the verse
held that it was only an optional standard of conduct and the owner
could therefore lawfully refuse the request. Nonetheless, the ethical
standard encouraging the manumission of a slave as a pious and

95. BERNARD LEWIS, RACE AND SLAVERY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN HISTORICAL
ENQUIRY 78 (1990) (citing commentary on Qur’an 5:87 by 12 FAKHAR AL-DIN AL-RAZI, ALTAFSIR AL-KABIR 71, 134 (1938)).
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meritorious act of charity undoubtedly gave flower to many such
contracts.
Indisputably, the best example of this emancipatory ethic is the
language found in chapter 90 of the Qur’an. Addressing the Prophet
Muhammad, the Holy Book asserts that there are two roads one can
take in life. It is the “high road” that is preferred and following that
road leads the righteous human being to free slaves.96 The Prophet
made sure to live according to this exhortation, showing a great
solicitude for the condition of the slaves in the society around him. As
we have pointed out, his example inspired his companions to
emancipate thousands of slaves.97 In an oft-quoted statement, he
remarked that he would meet the man who “sells a free man as a slave
and devours his price” on Judgment Day.98 This is an explicit
condemnation of trafficking in free human beings. These facts should
lead even the most ardent traditionalist to conclude that the Qur’anic
intendment contemplated a gradual disappearance of slavery.99
Other juristic interpretations have gone even further. A number
of jurists have made the argument that the Qur’an’s repeated
assertions of the oneness of God, known in Arabic as the concept of
tauhid (or tawheed), also impliedly provide a sufficient
jurisprudential basis for declaring the abolition of slavery. In the
96. Qur’an, supra note 26, 90:1-20.
97. See ALI, supra note 79.
98. BUKHARI, supra note 67.
99. This is a modernist argument that was not made by traditionalist jurists until after
Enlightenment-centered scholars and abolitionists in the West began to press Muslim scholars
in the Islamic world to change their position on slavery. Nonetheless, in recent times many
scholars, Muslim and non-Muslim, traditionalist and modernist, have argued that the Qur’an
contemplates the gradual elimination of slavery. Most prominent is the Qur’anic commentary
of Sayyid Qutb, the late Egyptian theologian and Qur’anic scholar. 30 SAYYID QUTB, IN THE
SHADE OF THE QUR’AN 176-79 (M. Adil Salahi & Ashur Shamis trans., 1992) (recounting Abu
Bakr's constant and frequent emancipation of slaves after his conversion to Islam and arguing
that the verses in Surat ul-Balad (Chapter 90 of the Qur'an) require all Muslims to behave in
this way); see also C.W.W. GREENIDGE, SLAVERY 65 (1958) (citing and quoting Syed Ameer
Ali, the Indian Islamic modernist and author of THE SPIRIT OF ISLAM, and Eldon Rutter in
saying “the Koran rightly practiced would soon bring about the complete cessation of slavery,”
and Bertram Thomas, in saying: “In the abatement of slavery Arabia has been false to her
Prophet.”); MUHAMMAD RASHID RIDA, THE MUHAMMADAN REVELATION (1996). As we
noted earlier, see supra note 49 and accompanying text, Rida, an early twentieth-century
modernist who ultimately came to embrace a salafist philosophy, concluded that the Qur’an
has ten purposes, and one of is the elimination of slavery. For more discussion of this
development see infra notes 158-174 and accompanying text. This footnote draws from my
earlier research and writing on this issue. See, e.g., Definitions and Conceptions of Slave
Ownership in Islamic Law, supra note 56, at 51 n.55.
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recent times, the argument was most eloquently and forcefully put by
Shi’a jurists, including Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, an extraordinarily
influential Iraqi jurist who was hanged on the order of Saddam
Hussein in 1980, and the Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari, a disciple and
compatriot of the Ayatollah Khomeini and contemporary of Baqir alSadr, who was assassinated in 1979, in the early days of the Iranian
Revolution.100 Baqir al-Sadr argued that “[m]an’s submission to God
in Islam . . . is the toll whereby man breaks all other chains of
submission or slavery. . . . Therefore no power on earth has the right
to fare with his destiny.”101 Thus, according to Baqir al-Sadr, any
legal or moral regime permitting slavery is inconsistent with true
monotheism. Mutahhari made similar arguments, but they were more
specific and he cited the Qur’anic verse 3:64 from Surah Al-’Imran,
which supported the notion that recognition of any being with
authority over another human being, other than God, was un-Islamic
and violated core monotheistic principles announced in the Qur’an.
Mutahhari also argued that the idea of an uncompromising
submission to God is the ultimate expression of human freedom.
Therefore, submission to any being other than God would be a form
of shirk (association of other beings or things with Allah) and harmful
to one’s freedom. Mutahhari distinguished social freedom and
spiritual freedom, explaining that they are interdependent, and
inextricably bound to each other. If there is true social freedom, in the
Islamic sense, there can be no slavery.102 Mutahhari argued that, in
the Holy Qur’an, one of the explicit purposes of the Prophets was to
offer mankind social liberty and deliver human beings from mutual
enslavement. The Qur’anic call invites mankind to unite on two
things, as the idea behind the verse asserts: “[w]e worship none but
God and we associate no partner with Him, and none of us must be
slaves or masters of one another other than God.”103 This means,
according to Mutahhari, “the abolition of the order of servitude, the
100. I am indebted to Professor Mohammad Hashim Kamali for introducing me to the
arguments of these two jurists and I rely heavily on Professor Kamali’s citations and
quotations from their work. A fair amount of their work is now translated into English and I
would urge the reader to consult those translations, or their original works, directly.
101. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, FREEDOM, EQUALITY AND JUSTICE IN ISLAM 10
n.39 (1999) (citing MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL-SADR, CONTEMPORARY MAN AND THE SOCIAL
PROBLEM 141 (Yasin T.A. al-Jibouri, Tehran, Eng. trans., 1980)).
102. Id. (citing AYATULLAH MURTAZA MUTAHHARI, SPIRITUAL DISCOURSES, 28
(Alauddin Pazargady, Eng. trans., 1986)).
103. Id.
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system of exploitation of the exploiter and the exploited, getting rid of
inequality and enslavement.”104 In Mutahhari’s view, social liberty or
social freedom is also sacred.105
Some might argue that Mutahhari’s argument against slavery on
the basis of the Qur’anic verse 3:64 is the product of Shi’a exegesis,
which is rejected by many Sunnis as the product of a hyper-rationalist
Mu’tazila influence and not representative of mainstream schools of
Qur’anic interpretation.106 With respect to Mutahhari’s arguments
against slavery, this is not the case. Sayyid Qutb, the widely cited
Sunni theologian and commentator on the Qur’an, offered extensive
commentary on verse 3:64 in his masterful work, Fi Zilal al-Qur’an
(In the Shade of the Qur’an). Qutb’s work preceded Mutahhari’s
writings by some 20 years and, although he did not focus his remarks
on slavery and its abolition in the same way that Mutahhari later did,
it is important to note that he observed:
Corruption does not spread on earth unless Divinity is thus
ascribed to beings other than God. It is only when a human being
enslaves others, claiming that he himself must be obeyed, or that
he has the power to legislate and to set values and standards for
human society that corruption becomes rife. Such an assertion is
a claim of Godhead, even though the claimant may not state it in
as many words as Pharaoh did when he cried: “I am your lord,
most high.” (al-Nazi’at 79:24). To acknowledge such an

104. Id. at 41 (quoting and citing MUTAHHARI, supra note 102, at 30).
105. Id.
106. The Mu’tazila influence is generally defined as “a rationalist-oriented position that
emphasized the centrality of reason as an ordering principle in God’s being, of the structure of
the universe, and in the governance of human behavior. The rationalist position included, as its
corollary, belief in free will and individual responsibility for moral choices.” IRA M. LAPIDUS,
A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC SOCIETIES 106-07 (1988). The Mu’tazila influence was viewed as
controversial by many because it “denied that the Muslim ‘logos,’ the Quran, was part of God
or divine itself, but asserted that it was a created message inspired by God in Muhammad.” See
also MAJID FAKHRY, ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND MYSTICISM: A SHORT
INTRODUCTION 16 (1997). Fakhry characterizes the Mu’tazila influence as “the first articulate
theological movement in Islam,” and noted that “an early Mu’tazilite author, Abu’l-Husayn alKhayyat (ninth century), lists five fundamental principles (usul) on which, despite their
divergences, all Mu’tazilite factions were in agreement. These are God’s justice and unity, the
intermediate position, God’s immutable threats and rewards, His commanding the right and
His prohibiting the wrong.” See also GEORGE C. ANAWATI, Philosophy, Theology and
Mysticism, in THE LEGACY OF ISLAM, 350, 359-66 (Joseph Schact and Clifford E. Bosworth,
eds., 1974); FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM. ch.5 (2d ed. 1966); ABDULLAH SAEED, ISLAMIC
THOUGHT: AN INTRODUCTION 14 (2006).
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assertion by anyone is to be an idolater or to disbelieve in God. It
is indeed the worst type of corruption.107

At several other points in his commentary, Qutb argues that the
verse aims to make sure that “none is elevated above another,” that
“none enslaves another,” and that human beings “do not enslave one
another.” He posits that Islam is “total liberation of man from
enslavement by others,” that the Islamic system “is the only one that
makes that liberation a reality” and that slavery exists in the “most
advanced democracies as well as in the worse types of dictatorship.”
Qutb argues that the verse restates the principle that the Prophets were
sent to “help liberate people from the injustice inflicted by human
beings so that they could enjoy God’s absolute justice.”108 It is
unclear whether Mutahhari was aware of Qutb’s position when he
published his arguments against slavery during the Iranian Revolution
but their two positions are clearly consonant with each other.
In his discussion of these ideas, Professor Kamali differentiated
the Western concept of freedom from that which is contained in
Islamic theology, observing that “[h]uman freedom is . . . a necessary
concomitant of Divine justice.”109 While Islamic theological schools
largely agree with this premise, they diverge on the extent to which
human will and judgment can be exercised with respect to the will of
God.110 Kamali adopts the position that the will of God, as expressed
in the Qur’an, does not command humans “merely to surrender” to
these commands, but to first “discover and understand the nature of
God’s message.”111 The Qur’an makes plain that every individual is
responsible for determining his or her own destiny.112 With respect to
slavery, there is no command in the Qur’an, other than arguably the
language in verse 47:4, which is concerned with prisoners of war,
would authorize Muslims to take slaves.113 This suggests that the

107. 2 QUTB, supra note 99, at 102.
108. Id. at 103-04.
109. FREEDOM, EQUALITY AND JUSTICE IS ISLAM, supra note 101, at 12-13 (citing
Munayminah, Mushkilat al-Hurriyyah, 100-01 n.47 (Jamil Munayminah, Mushkilat alHurriyyah fi’l Islam, ed., 1974)).
110. Id. at 13-14 (citing PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 72, at
342ff).
111. Id. at 14.
112. Id. at 87 (citing Ismail al-Faruqi, Islam and Other Faiths, in THE CHALLENGE OF
ISLAM, n.53 (Altaf Gauhar ed., 1978).
113. Qur’an, supra note 26, 47:4.
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Qur’anic vision only contemplates the taking of slaves in the narrow
circumstances presented by the taking of prisoners during war.
In point of fact, Qutb disagreed with the conclusion that verse
47:4 permits the enslavement of prisoners of war. In his commentary
on the verse, he argued that the plain text of the verse only
contemplates the setting of prisoners free, gratis, or for ransom. “The
Qur’anic verse does not mention any third option, such as putting
idolater captives to death or binding them into slavery.”114 Qutb
acknowledged that there was a fairly widely held juristic opinion
authorizing the enslavement of prisoners, based on interpretations of
the verse and the practice of the Prophet Muhammad.115 He argued,
however, that the opinions were “in response to prevalent universal
situations and common practices in war” and that the Prophet
enslaved some prisoners “in order to deal with situations that could
not be otherwise be dealt with.”116 He concluded that “[p]utting
prisoners into slavery is not an Islamic rule; it is a procedure dealing
with special circumstances.”117 Qutb does not identify the “special
circumstances” but he is clear that the text does not authorize
enslavement of prisoners of war and that “no human being of good
manners would ever say that his view is better than God’s ruling.”118
Taking into account these diverging theological views, it would
seem that the question of whether slavery ought to be permitted to
continue would turn on one’s view of what is demanded by Islamic
notions of justice. Kamali points to numerous Qur’anic verses
supporting the proposition that, as a matter of justice, freedom may be
sought “through all possible means, as the Qur’an directs,”119 that
Muslims have an obligation to assist all those who struggle for
freedom,120 and that freedom is “an inherent attribute of all human
beings.”121 On the basis of these verses, Kamali concludes that
freedom is “the normative and original state,” and the absence or
restriction of freedom is, then, the exception to the norm.122 To
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
42:41).
120.
121.
122.

15 QUTB, supra note 99, at 394.
Id. at 394-99.
Id. at 400.
Id.
Id. at 400-01.
FREEDOM, EQUALITY AND JUSTICE IN ISLAM, supra note 101, at 15 (citing Qur’an
Id. (citing Qur’an 22:41) (commanding Muslims to “enjoin good and forbid evil”).
Id. at 16 (referencing Qur’an 30:30).
Id.
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illustrate the practical implications of this norm, Kamali refers to the
status of the laqit, or foundling, whose parents are unknown, and
hence whose status as a free person or slave is also unknown. The
fiqh on laqit recognizes that such infants are presumed free, and that
the community is under a duty to safeguard the wellbeing of the
laqit.123
Kamali points to other verses in the Qur’an that discuss slavery
in the context of justice. Surah-ul-A’raf, for example, indicates that,
of the three most important missions of the Prophet Muhammad, one
was to “remove from them the burdens and the shackles which were
on them before.”124 Another example is a dialogue between Moses
and Pharaoh, in which Pharaoh accuses Moses of ingratitude, and he
responds, “[a]nd is it a favor with which you reproach me that you
have enslaved the Children of Israel?”125 Kamali similarly argues that
forced labor is forbidden because the Qur’an declared Pharaoh, who
employed forced labor, to be “an agent of corruption.”126 Moreover,
he concludes that “[t]o pay less than what a worker deserves is
tantamount to extortion and exploitation of the sort that the Qur’an
has clearly forbidden.”127
Examination of the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad similarly
shows the establishment of an emancipatory ethic on the question of
slavery. As we have pointed out, there is no question that the Prophet
gave, received, and owned slaves and that he used slavery as an
instrument of conquest in war. The example of the enslavement of the
women and children of the Banu Qurayza tribe is perhaps the most
prominent but there are other examples as well. Nonetheless, there is
also a surfeit of material demonstrating the Prophet’s clear preference
for the emancipation of slaves and his constant inducement of similar
behavior in those that surrounded him. Like the Qur’an, the Prophet’s
example accepts the existence of slavery as a social, military and
political fact but its normative message counsels the implementation
of an ethical horizon that would lead to its elimination. Perhaps the
best examples of this horizon are the reforms on slavery instituted by

123. Id. at 17.
124. Id. at 18 (quoting Qur’an 7:157).
125. Id. (quoting Qur’an 26:22).
126. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, RIGHT TO EDUCATION, WORK, AND WELFARE IN
ISLAM 152 (2010) (relying upon Qur’an 28:4).
127. Id. at 150 (citing Qur’an 7:85).
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the Caliph ‘Umar ibn Khuttab and his steadfast insistence that the
enslavement of captives in war be minimized or eradicated.128
What emerges from modern interpretations of the Qur’an and
Sunnah provisions on slavery outlined in this Article is a focus on
slavery as a temporary and unnatural human condition, one that is tied
to a greater social context that takes contemporary Islamic
understandings of justice and morality into account. It is important to
note that both Qutb and Mutahhari were writing and thinking about
slavery in the context of great social upheaval in their respective
societies. They engaged in “rights talk” on slavery. Muslims jurists
have thus come to see that slavery is a social evil that must be
abolished.129 There actually appears to be support for this juristic
position in the Qur’anic text and the Sunnah.
B. Is There Now an Ijmāʿ (Islamic Juristic Consensus) on Slavery?
In Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, four sources are available to the
jurist who seeks to discover, know, explain, and apply Islamic rules of
behavior.130 We have examined two of those sources, the Qur’an and
128. See SHIBLI NUMANI, UMAR 125-27 (2004) (recounting ‘Umar’s emancipation of the
Arab prisoners held in slavery after their defeat in the Ridda wars against Abu Bakr and his
concomitant declaration that “no Arab shall be held in slavery,” as well as his repatriation of
Egyptian prisoners sold into slavery after the conquest of Egypt and his orders not to enslave
prisoners taken in the conquest of Persia). It should also be noted that ‘Umar established the
rule of the Umm Walad, which declared that a child of a free man and a concubine was to be
considered to be free and that the concubine was entitled to freedom at the death of her owner.
The rule also forbid the separation of mother and child in such circumstances. See J. Schacht,
‘Umm Walad,’ in X ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 857-59 (P.J. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E.
Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs, eds., 2000).
129. The evolution of the position of Muslim jurists on slavery is similar to the evolution
of the opinions of American jurists on the wrong-headedness of the decision in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), which held that descendants of African slaves in the United
States could never be citizens and that Congress did not have the power to deprive a slaveowner of his property interest in a slave, even if that slave traveled to free territory. Mark A.
Graber has argued, with some force, that the Dred Scott decision was rightly decided at the
time and it is only because of evolving sentiments in American constitutional jurisprudence
and sectional politics that the constitutional “evil” of slavery came to be an intolerable
concept. This argument is intimately bound up with a notion of progress that has come to
dominate American constitutional jurisprudence and politics. See MARK A. GRABER, DRED
SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 8-14 (2006). Many of the Muslim jurists
and opinion makers who now oppose slavery may be evincing a similar notion of progress. I
am indebted to my colleague Alice Ristroph for bringing this comparison to my attention.
130. The Shi’a jurisprudence also relies on four sources but it uses a different approach
with respect to the application of the fourth source, aql (“thought” or “rationality” or
“reasoning”). Application of this source in Shi’a jurisprudence looks to the opinions of the
Shi’a imams for guidance. The fourth source in the Sunni jurisprudence, qiyās or “analogical
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Sunnah, in relationship to the problem of slavery. These two sources
are primary and both are to be consulted first in answering any
inquiry seeking to discover the divine law, with the Qur’an being
preeminent. Using these two sources, one might ask whether slavery
remains lawful in Islam or, more specifically, whether the sources
would permit abolition by lawmakers in a modern-day Islamic state.
Both sources obviously establish that slavery was indeed lawful at the
time of the revelation but it is contested with respect to whether God
intended it to remain a lawful practice and whether it could now be
lawfully abolished. Although there are Qur’anic and Sunnaic
provisions and a vast corpus of juristic fiqhī opinions, clearly
announcing rules governing relationships between enslaved and free
and acknowledging the lawfulness of the practice of ownership of
slaves at the time of the revelation, there are also provisions in the
Qur’an, as we have suggested above, which would inferentially
support a gradual elimination of slavery and even a concomitant ban.
The Sunnah is similarly equivocal. While the Prophet Muhammad
owned and dealt in slaves, his example was overwhelmingly an
emancipatory one, giving rise to the argument that members of
Islamic societies emulating his example should strive to achieve a
slavery-free society.
The equivocalness of the two primary sources on the question of
abolition gives space for jurists interpreting those sources to offer
their opinions and craft rules and policies reflecting their
understandings of the Divine Will. It is this great pluralism of opinion
in Islamic juristic thought that led to the development of the
madhhabs or ‘schools of law’ in both the Sunni and Shi’a
jurisprudence.131 A proper ijmāʿ (Islamic juristic consensus) is one
reached by all of the mujtahids132 in a given generation and, once that
reasoning” also allows the seeking of guidance from jurists but this is not necessarily required.
PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 72, 16-116, 228-305; IMRAN AHSAN
KHAN NYAZEE, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 141-231 (2000).
131. For background on the “madhhabs” see generally ABU AMEENAH BILAL PHILIPS,
THE EVOLUTION OF FIQH: ISLAMIC LAW AND THE MADHHABS (2000); Bernard Weiss, The
Madhhab in Islamic Legal Theory, in THE ISLAMIC SCHOOL OF LAW: EVOLUTION,
DEVOLUTION AND PROGRESS (Peri Bearman et al. eds., 2005); Christopher Melchert, The
Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, in THE FORMATION OF ISLAMIC LAW (Wael B. Hallaq
ed., 2004); SHERMAN A. JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF SHIHAB AL-DIN AL-QARAFI 53-141 (1996).
132. A mujtahid is a person who is qualified to engage ijtihad, “the effort a jurist makes
in order to deduce the law, which is not self-evident, from the sources.” PRINCIPLES OF
ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 72, 468-99, 523.
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happens, Muslims are not free to disobey the rule established. As one
might suspect, there are very few matters that have become the
subject of an ijmāʿ in Islamic legal history.133 Imam Shafi’i and jurists
coming after him have all agreed that there does not need to be an
explicit pronouncement of an ijmāʿ by the mujtahids in order for us to
draw the conclusion that a consensus on a particular question has
been reached. If a legal rule or practice is well known to the mujtahids
and none objects to it, or if a number of jurists announce their opinion
on a question of law and none of the qualified mujtahids disagrees, it
may be concluded that an ijmāʿ on that question exists.134
It is arguable that an ijmāʿ or juristic consensus on the abolition
of slavery now exists among the Islamic jurists. This is certainly so
with respect to any effort by Muslims to enslave other human beings
through commercial means or by way of the civil administration of
property and inheritance law. There are simply no lawfully owned
slaves that could be purchased or obtained in this manner because
slavery is illegal in all of the world’s jurisdictions, including the
world’s Islamic jurisdictions. This is a well-known fact among the
world’s leading Islamic jurists and no self-respecting mujtahid would
disagree with the conclusion that it is impossible to legally purchase a
slave in any open market in the world today and that slavery should
remain illegal.135
We earlier referred to opinions of jurists that seemed to suggest
that the head of an Islamic government could order the enslavement
of prisoners of war during the conduct of a lawful jihad. Islamic law
posits that all other forms of enslavement, including plunder of
innocent civilian populations, are unlawful. Whether enslavement
resulting from military conquest could actually materialize in modern
times depends on whether an Islamic state could actually conduct a
lawful jihad, particularly a jihad defending the citizens of the State.
Declaration of a jihad is one of the responsibilities vested in the
133. Some commonly cited examples of ijmāʿ are rules resolving questions relating to
use of equipment in the army, the organization of mosques, the settings for religious rituals,
and questions involving other aspects of worldly affairs such as habitation, agriculture and
politics. Questions related to the applicability of certain customs may also be covered by ijma`.
See AHMAD HASAN, THE DOCTRINE OF IJMĀʿ IN ISLAM 105-08 (1976).
134. Id. at 111-19.
135. See Open Letter to Dr. Ibrahim Awwad Al-Badri, Alias ‘Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi,’
LETTERTOBAGHDADI.COM (Sept. 19, 2014), www.lettertobaghdadi.com [hereinafter Letter to
Baghdadi] (asserting that “no scholar of Islam disputes that one of Islam’s aims is to abolish
slavery” and signed by many prominent Muslim jurists and opinion-makers).
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Islamic caliph. Actions taken to defend a Muslim community,
attacked because of their religious beliefs, may also qualify as a
lawful jihad, even without a caliphal declaration.136 There have been
several military conflagrations in recent times that might qualify as
lawful jihads, although it is arguable that none could so qualify
because there is no lawfully appointed Caliph in the world today.
Nonetheless, a defensive jihad might still qualify as lawful and the
military struggle over Palestine, the Bosnia war, the independence
struggle in Chechnya, and the military resistance to the Iraq and
Afghanistan invasions might, in some minds, qualify as lawful
defensive jihads. In practical fact, however, in none of these
conflagrations have Muslim military commanders enslaved prisoners.
Prisoners are either killed or held for ransom or exchange, as is
permitted by the Qur’an. It seems that no thought has been given to
enslaving them. This fact would also give rise to the argument that,
even with respect to prisoners of war, there is now an ijma’
prohibiting their enslavement.
In response to the brutal death and destruction caused by ISIS’s
effort to establish a transnational Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,
hundreds of Muslim political leaders, religious scholars and opinion
makers worldwide endorsed an open letter addressed to the “fighters
and followers of the self-declared ‘Islamic State.’”137 The authors
collaborated and relied heavily on the Qur’an in denouncing ISIS’s
actions and ideologies as un-Islamic. 138
Importantly for our purposes, the authors also concluded that
there is a now an Islamic juristic consensus banning slavery and slave
trading. The letter is very specific. For example, the authors
concluded “[t]he re-introduction of slavery is forbidden in Islam. It
was abolished by universal consensus.”139 Further, “[n]o scholar of
136. See generally RICHARD BONNEY, JIHAD: FROM QUR’AN TO BIN LADEN 53-90, 11126 (2007).
137. See Letter to Baghdadi, supra note 135.
138. Id.
139. Id. It should be noted that a well-regarded Syrian Muslim scholar of Islam, Sheikh
Muhammad al-Yaqoubi, has recently published, in Arabic and English, a broad rejection of the
ISIS ideology, labeling the movement as an example of Khawarijism (following the practice of
those who rebelled against orthodox Islam during the time of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs),
declaring them to be disbelievers and offering the legal opinion that Muslims have a duty to
wage war against them. SHAYKH MUHAMMAD AL-YAQOUBI, REFUTING ISIS: A REBUTTAL OF
ITS RELIGIOUS AND IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS (2015). Sheikh Yaqoubi’s publication of the
book, by his own words, seeks to further a commendable goal, e.g., exposing the infirmities of
the ISIS ideology, particularly in the minds of the youth, and condemning the group’s horrific
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Islam disputes that one of Islam’s aims is to abolish slavery.”140 The
authors cited Surat Al-Balad (chapter 90) which, as we earlier noted,
exhorts the Prophet Muhammad to free slaves.141 The letter goes on to
cite Al-Bidayah wal-Nihayah in which Ibn Kathir says, “The Prophet
freed male and female slaves . . . and after the Prophet died, there
were absolutely no slaves of his to be inherited.”142 The letter also
criticizes partisans of the Islamic State for their treatment of
women.143 The letter should be read against a background in the
Middle East that shows continuing difficult circumstances involving
“modern day” slavery and human trafficking. In some locales the
practices are particularly virulent and horrific, especially with respect
to the treatment of women.144 Governments in these communities
have recently begun to enact legislative measures designed to combat
such practices and to alleviate suffering endured by victims.145 The
record of atrocities and barbaric behaviors. Unfortunately, by declaring members of ISIS to be
disbelievers, he may have fallen into the same trap as the enemy he seeks to combat.
Interestingly, Sheikh Yaqoubi agrees that there is a consensus against slavery, binding
Muslims and making ISIS actions illegal, but he grounds the authority for that consensus in the
fact that Muslim nations have all ratified numerous international anti-slavery conventions and
therefore, since their military adversaries will not enslave Muslim captives, Muslims should
reciprocate by refraining from enslaving prisoners. He suggests that Muslims would be
authorized to take slaves if their adversaries resumed the practice. Id. at 15-17. Consequently,
the book, expected to be widely read in the Muslim world, does not add much to the discourse
that Muslims should be having on the moral issues surrounding the question of slavery.
140. See Letter to Baghdadi, supra note 135.
141. Al-Balad, 90:12-14
142. See Letter to Baghdadi, supra note 135.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Mohammed A. Auwal, Ending the Exploitation of Migrant Workers in the
Gulf, 34 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 96 (2010) (describing 430 runaway maids
being sheltered in the Indonesian, Filipino, and Sri Lankan embassies in Kuwait at any given
moment, with many of the maids complaining of overwork, sexual abuse, beatings and torture
inflicted by their “employers”).
145. The governments of four predominantly or officially Muslim States—The Gambia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates—have expressly abolished slavery in their
constitutions. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA, 1997, art. 20 (Gam.);
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF MALAYSIA, Aug. 27, 1957, art. 6 (Malay.); PAKISTAN CONST.
Aug. 14, 1973, art. 11 (Pak.); CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, Dec. 2, 1971,
art. 34 (U.A.E.). Nine constitutions in Muslim nations have express prohibitions against forced
labor. The Constitution of Pakistan, for example, provides that “all forms of forced labour and
traffic in human beings are prohibited.” PAKISTAN CONST., art. 11; see also CONSTITUTION OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH, 1972, art. 34 (Bangl.); CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA, art. 20; CONSTITUTION OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN,
Jan. 1, 1952, art. 13 (Jordan); TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 18 (Turk.). Egypt, Jordan, Djibouti, Syria,
Mauritania, Algeria, Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nigeria,
Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates have all recently enacted anti-trafficking legislation in
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struggle against human trafficking in the Middle East continues and,
as it does so, the emerging Islamic juristic consensus against chattel
slavery becomes clearer and clearer.
C. Isis, Boko Haram, and the Relationship Between the Shari’ah and
International Humanitarian Law
We have pointed out that almost all of the verses on slavery in
the Qur’an are emancipatory in character. After the completion of the
revelation of the Qur’an and after the recognition of the example of
the Prophet Muhammad began to take hold, the Islamic jurisprudence
developed an overwhelmingly emancipatory ethical approach toward
slavery. This took time but eventually resulted in the constant, regular
and oftentimes pietistic emancipation of slaves. There was also, in
many places, the establishment of governments and military
organizations staffed and led by slaves, former slaves, and their
progeny.146 ISIS and Boko Haram seem to be ignoring the
emancipatory aspect of the legal history in Islam, focusing instead on
Islam’s imperial legacy and the role of slavery, and particularly slavetrading and plunder, in furthering that legacy.
various forms and permutations. See Mohamed Y. Mattar, Human Rights Legislation in the
Arab World: The Case of Human Trafficking, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 101, 104 (2011); see also
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Combating Trafficking in Persons in Accordance with the
Principles of Islamic Law, 53-55, http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/
UNODC_Trafficking_and_Islamic_Law_-_Amended.pdf, (Mohamed Y. Mattar, principal
author). Professor Mattar, Research Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Protection
Project at Johns Hopkins University is without doubt the leading observer and commentator on
efforts to abolish modern day slavery and human trafficking in the Arab world and his
scholarly writings have been an invaluable resource in preparing this article. See, e.g., Mattar,
Trafficking in Persons, supra note 53; Mohamed Y. Mattar, Comparative Models of Reporting
Mechanisms on the Status of Trafficking in Human Beings, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1355
(2008).
146. For example, 34 of the 37 ‘Abbasid caliphs reigning between 750 C.E. and 1258
C.E. had slave origins. See BORGE FREDERICKSEN, SLAVERY AND ITS ABOLITION IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY EGYPT 78 (1977). At various times dynasties and governments ruled
by slaves, emancipated slaves and the progeny of slaves dominated governments in Oman,
Iraq, Safavid Iran, Delhi, India, and Egypt. See SUSSAN BABAIE, ET AL., SLAVES OF THE
SHAH: NEW ELITES OF SAFAVID IRAN (2004); DAVID AYALON, ISLAM AND THE ABODE OF
WAR: MILITARY SLAVES AND ISLAMIC ADVERSARIES (1994); AHMED HAMOUD ALMAAMIRY, OMAN AND EAST AFRICA (3d rev. ed. 1985); REGINALD COUPLAND, EAST AFRICA
AND ITS INVADERS (1938); REGINALD COUPLAND, THE EXPLOITATION OF EAST AFRICA
1856-1890: THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE SCRAMBLE (1939); PETER A. JACKSON, THE DELHI
SULTANATE: A POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY (1999); HUGH KENNEDY, WHEN
BAGHDAD RULED THE MUSLIM WORLD: THE RISE AND FALL OF ISLAM’S GREATEST
DYNASTY (2005).
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One key aspect of this imperial legacy was the conduct of war.
Islam’s emancipatory ethic with regard to slavery created a paradox,
enabling slaves and former slaves to be integrated into the Muslim
societies in the Middle East while at the same time fueling an
aggressive and imperialistic effort to capture and enslave more nonMuslims to replace those who were emancipated. The salafist
paradigm on slavery focuses on slavery and slave-trading as it was
practiced by the companions of the Prophet and their immediate
successors, but it seems to have nothing to say about the imperial era
that followed over the next thousand years. It should be noted that, in
a war conducted under Islamic law rules, in the absence of abolition,
soldiers who capture war booty, which would include human beings,
are permitted to buy and sell these human beings in an open market.
ISIS has in fact established such markets.147 This is said to be
permitted by the Islamic law, viewed through the jihadi-salafist lens.
The conduct of war and the enslavement of captives are then easily
conflated with the imperialist paradigm that characterizes much of
Islamic history after the era of the salaf al-salih had past. Jihadi
salafism becomes a new form of Muslim imperialism. The conduct of
war under these circumstances, without constraint, leads to tragic and
horrific results, as we have seen.
The international humanitarian law, as it has been developing,
characterizes such conduct as war crimes, with individuals and States
to be held accountable for such crimes in a system of international
tribunals.148 Customary international law and the international human
rights law also strongly condemn such behaviors, providing

147. ISIS Sex Slave Market: Syrian Women Sold in Iraq, ARA NEWS (July 15, 2015),
http://aranews.net/2015/07/isis-sex-slave-market-syrian-women-sold-in-iraq/ (100 Syrian
women offered for sale in a market established in Fallujah, Anbar Province); Richard Engel
and James Novogrod, ISIS Terror: Yazidi Woman Recalls Horrors Of Slave Auction, NBC
NEWS (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-terror-yazidi-woman
-recalls-horrors-slave-auction-n305856.
148. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLUME I: RULES 299-352 (Cambridge University
Press 2005) (outlining fundamental guarantees to be accorded to civilians and prisoners in
international and non-international armed conflicts, including the right to be free from slavery,
rape, mutilation, torture, forced labor, and other arbitrary deprivations of liberty and
indignities); DANIEL THURER, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THEORY, PRACTICE,
CONTEXT 121-84; 231-37 (2011) (providing account of the basic norms, the intersection of
international humanitarian law and international human rights law, the emerging system of
accountability for individuals and states and the system’s encounter with the Islamic law of
war).
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mechanisms for States and individuals to be called to account.149 Both
systems of international norms and regulations developed in response
to the conduct of war, the acquisition of territories and properties, and
the treatment of prisoners of war and civilian non-combatants by
imperialist entities.150 The condemnation of the behaviors of the Nazi
regime and the punishment of individual Nazi perpetrators after
World War II is the prime example of the application these systems,
but, as Jenny S. Martinez has shown, the use of international tribunals
in such circumstances can actually be traced back to nineteenth
century efforts to combat the international slave trade.151
The international humanitarian law and its corollaries in the
customary international law and international human rights systems
also serve hortatory purposes in that they encourage States and
belligerents in armed conflicts to honor and respect norms designed to
“restrain the parties to an armed conflict from wanton cruelty and
ruthlessness,” and “provide essential protection to those most directly
affected by the conflict.”152 The development of this hortatory
function flows, at least in part, from the “value monist” underpinnings
of international humanitarian law, that is, underpinnings which seek
to advance a universal standard for the conduct of armed conflicts and
the treatment of innocent non-combatants and prisoners of war.153 A
government or an insurgency that does not respect the norms we have
149. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2006); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law and other Serious
Violations of Human Rights, in POST CONFLICT JUSTICE 3 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002);
ANTONIO CASSESE, GUIDO ACQUAVIVA, MARY FAN AND ALEX WHITING, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY (2011).
150. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 148, at xxv-li. The account of the law
provided by jurists advancing a “value monist” approach, like Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck,
is indeed the standard account. There is also an argument that international humanitarian law is
in fact a continuation of the “civilizing mission” that characterized 19th century Western
imperialism. See, e.g., ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
151. JENNY S. MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 160, 164 (2011).
152. FRITS KALSHOVEN AND LIESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF
WAR 12 (2001).
153. The Evolution of International Humanitarian Law and Arms Control Agreements,
in A MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
11-15 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2000); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Commemorative Piece: 50th
Anniversary Commemorative Essay: Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 50 VA. J.
INT’L L. 269, 286-287 (2010); see also CHRISTOPHER R. ROSSI, BROKEN CHAIN OF BEING:
JAMES BROWN SCOTT AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 85, n.65 (1998)
(noting that Grotius cited Aristotle at least 143 times in De Jure Belli ac. Pacis).
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described runs the risk of being treated as a pariah in the community
of nations. The Muslim or Islamic insurgencies we have identified
earlier, as well as other insurgencies and even many governments,
have violated many of the norms of the developing international
humanitarian law, sometimes with impunity. Perhaps the most
commonly cited examples of such violations have involved suicide
attacks on religious institutions and other places where innocent
civilians might gather, the taking of hostages for ransom or exchange
of prisoners, and bombings and other attacks designed to create terror
and widespread panic in the civilian population.154
Even though these actions of Muslim insurgencies in some cases
have been quite ghastly and appalling, drawing condemnation from
many quarters, we suggest here that the re-imposition of de jure
slavery and slave-trading on innocent captives and even prisoners of
war is qualitatively different, a form of brutality and injustice that is
on a completely different level—the same level as genocide, torture,
piracy and racial discrimination—a level that will draw universal
condemnation and approbation without dissent or apology, given the
worldwide consensus that exists with respect to de jure slavery and
slave-trading.
Even if we were to grant a caliphal government the right to
govern its population by a salafi vision of Islamic law, in an effort to
bring “the good life” to that population, we think the reinstitution of
de jure slavery and slave-trading, given its sordid and horrific history,
would doom any such a government to a super-pariah status, with
grave implications for the future of Islamic law in the international
setting and absolutely terrible outcomes for Muslims within the
jurisdiction and around the world. Re-imposing the worst aspects of
the Islamic imperial legacy, in the name of this salafi vision, only
compounds this problem. We pose three questions here that we think
show the moral bankruptcy and a historical impoverishment of this
view of Islamic law.
First, let us imagine entry into the Islamic State by a modern-day
human trafficker, say someone trading in non-Muslim women and
girls kidnapped from Nepal or lured to the Middle East or West
Africa from Ethiopia or Eastern Europe or Southeast Asia. Might that
154. The September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, DC and the
November 13, 2015 attacks in Paris immediately come to mind as preeminent examples of
this kind of phenomenon.
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trafficker be interested in placing his human commodities for sale in
markets created by ISIS or Boko Haram? Would ISIS or Boko Haram
allow the trafficker entry? Would citizens of the new Islamic State be
allowed to buy such trafficked women? Would the trafficker also be
interested in buying captured women and girls in ISIS and Boko
Haram markets so that they might be trafficked to locations other than
Iraq, Syria or Nigeria? The economic attraction and the relative ease
of accomplishment of these tasks, not to mention the fact that the
trafficker will argue that he should enjoy a de jure immunity for such
entrepreneurship while present in the Islamic State, suggest that our
hypotheticals may not be implausible or far-fetched. It was noted
earlier that news reports indicate that human traffickers are currently
making large profits repatriating enslaved Yezidi women.
Continuation of these markets in the Islamic State will only fuel such
entrepreneurship.
Second, several insurgencies in Africa (in addition to Boko
Haram) and in the Sinai have styled themselves as “provinces” of the
Islamic State and declared their allegiance to the caliphate. Will these
insurgencies also be permitted to establish markets for the buying and
selling of chattel slaves? Could they trade in slaves with other
“provinces” or with the caliphate itself? Would the slaves be limited
to those captured in war? In an era involving an explosion of human
trafficking, how would the Islamic State prevent infiltration of such
markets by entrepreneurial traffickers seeking to capitalize on the
economic opportunity to sell their kidnapped human commodities in a
jurisdiction where such transactions are protected by law?
Thirdly, the reader should note that there is a long record of
employment of enslaved castrated males, generally called “eunuchs,”
in Islamic imperial history.155 Although the Islamic law technically
prohibited the castration of males, the practice was tolerated by many
in the early Islamic governments and jurists who advised them. NonMuslims performed the surgery on captured males and then returned
them to their Muslim owners. Eunuchs were often employed in
positions of great responsibility and authority and wielded a
substantial amount of power even though they were technically
155. The Islamic imperial entities were certainly not the only societies to employ
eunuchs. PIOTRA O. SCHOLZ, EUNUCHS AND CASTRATI: A CULTURAL HISTORY (2001);
WOMEN, MEN, AND EUNUCHS: GENDER IN BYZANTIUM (Liz James ed., 1997); TAISUKE
MITAMURA, CHINESE EUNUCHS: THE STRUCTURE OF INTIMATE POLITICS (1970); SHIH-SHAN
HENRY TSAI, THE EUNUCHS IN THE MING DYNASTY (1996).
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enslaved.156 Would the partisans of the Islamic State countenance the
return of this practice?
The establishment of markets for the buying and selling of
human beings captured in armed conflicts and the enslavement of
such captives is justified by partisans and ideologues of the Islamic
State and Boko Haram on the basis of an atavistic ahistorical
interpretation of the Sharīʿah. There are two important sets of
historical events that this interpretation of the Sharīʿah ignores. The
first, as we have suggested, is the nearly 1,000 year history of Muslim
slave-trading, after the end of the era of the salaf al-sāliḥ, that was
created by the paradoxical demand for slaves in the Islamic heartland.
This demand generated a commercial and imperial practice, illegal
under the Sharīʿah, that produced widespread death, great and
prolonged suffering, the wholesale destruction of many communities
and the uprooting of families and social relationships in societies
stretching from East and West Africa to India and Southeast Asia.
This event might be described as a “holocaust,” in the same way that
the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the extermination of the Jews and
other minorities in Nazi Germany have similarly been described.
Significantly, many Muslims, including many Muslim scholars and
historians, are unaware of the details of this history and certainly
unaware of its implications for Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic
legal history. These grave and weighty implications should be crucial
in assessing the jurisprudential and juridical claims of ISIS and Boko
Haram. Muslim Sharīʿah scholars and other scholars of Islam can no
longer ignore the history of slavery, trafficking and slave trading in
Muslim communities. A self-reflective historical consciousness on
this issue is sorely needed.
The second set of events that is ignored by the partisans of the
Islamic State and Boko Haram is the history of the actions of the Nazi
regime during World War II, particularly its policies of enslavement
and extermination of Jewish and other minorities living under its
jurisdiction. Those events were central to the creation of
contemporary notions of international humanitarian law. We suggest
here that those events also cannot be ignored by those who seek to
establish a political entity or government that obeys the Sharīʿah. If
there is an ijmāʿ on slavery and slave-trading among Islamic jurists,
156. See HATHAWAY, supra note 60. For a general discussion of role of eunuchs in
Islamic imperial history, see SHAUN ELIZABETH MARMON, EUNUCHS AND SACRED
BOUNDARIES IN ISLAM (1995).
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that ijmāʿ has come about because of the events that occurred in Nazi
Germany as well as the events in the Muslim world that led to a
region-wide, indeed world-wide, abolition of de jure slavery.
The actions of the Islamic State and Boko Haram are therefore
not just important for the challenges they present for the success of
international humanitarian law and its value-monist, enlightenmentcentered underpinnings. They are also important for notions of global
Islamic selfhood held by Muslims in their relationship to the nonMuslim world. We argue here that it is incumbent on all thinking and
historically aware Muslims and scholars of Islam to engage the
partisans, jurists and ideologues of the Islamic State with respect to
their vision of Islamic law on the questions of slavery and slavetrading. Consideration of the morality of slavery and slave trading is
at the heart of humankind’s view of itself. Revulsion at the thought of
enslavement or slave trading is a key component in the development
of modern notions of human dignity. The issue is therefore an
existential one for Muslims and for Islamic law, just as it was for
Europeans and Western law.
D. Slavery, Moral Progress and the Public Interest and Well-Being of
the Muslim Community: Examples From History
This Article’s exposition on the need for a critical and selfreflective history of slavery and abolition in the Muslim world could
end here. Instead of ending the exposition a short coda—as food for
thought on the status of slavery as a “good” or “evil” in the Islamic
worldview—will be offered.
Muslim jurists have agreed that God acted with a defined
purpose in revealing the Sharīʿah. It is said that this purpose
manifested God’s intention “to preserve for humankind the five
essential elements of their well-being, namely their religion, life,
intellect, offspring, and property.”157 These five elements are
described as the penultimate “purposes” or “objectives” (maqāṣid) of
the Sharīʿah and are considered to be universals.158 There are many
particular rules of the fiqh that have been enacted to further one or
157. Felicitas Opwis, Maslaha in Contemporary Islamic Legal Theory, 12 ISLAMIC L. &
SOC’Y 182, 188 (2005). “Intellect” is often described as “reason” and “offspring” is often
described as “progeny” or “lineage.”
158. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI’AH LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 27-37, 123-39
(2008).
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more of these universals. The jurists have also designated the five
essential universals as maṣlaḥas, or elements that further the wellbeing, welfare or “public interest” of the entire Muslim community.159
Although a particular rule of fiqh may not be mandatorily obligatory
or prohibited, in accordance with the Islamic system of aḥkām alkhamsa, the universal which it is related to may very well be “legally
more important” and receive a “more stringent legal value” than one
or more of its corresponding particulars.160 This might result in a rule
of fiqh attaining the status of a rule that mandates or prohibits
behavior under particular circumstances. “The universals, being
certain, are unchangeable whereas the particulars of the law,
admitting probability, are susceptible to change.”161 Perhaps the best159. The concept of maṣlaḥa is the subject of a well-developed discourse in Islamic
jurisprudence. Al-Ghazali first tied the concept to understandings of the Sharīʿah by arguing
that any measure which secures one of the five values that he identified as the “purposes” of
the Sharīʿah is a maṣlaḥa (“benefit” or “good”) and anything which violates one of those
purposes is a mafsadah (“evil” or “harm”). KAMALI, supra note 125, at 351. There can be an
“attested” maṣlaḥa—-a maṣlaḥa based on an express pronouncement in the text—-and an
“unattested” maṣlaḥa, or one derived from considerations of legal rationality or benefit that are
not explicitly dealt with in the text. Most of the discourse has been concerned with the
unattested maṣlaḥa, as one might imagine, because it is here that the jurists found the means to
allow for or prohibit legal change. In these cases it is said that there is “no concrete indication
(dalala) in the Qur’an, in Sunna, or by consensus (ijma’).” Felicitas Opwis, Islamic Law and
Legal Change: The Concept of Maslaha in Classical and Contemporary Islamic Legal Theory
in SHARI’A: ISLAMIC LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT, 62, 66 (2007). There are four
models of the concept that have dominated the jurisprudence. The “Ghazali/Razi” model
integrates the unattested maṣlaḥa into the procedure normally used to find a ratio legis when
seeking to analogize the applicability of a text to a new situation. Id. at 66-67. This might
enable the jurist to reject an existing analogy where considerations of public interest or welfare
predominate. The second model, used by the Maliki jurist Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi, extended its
use in cases of analogy even further than the Ghazali/Razi approach and he also used the
concept to rationalize legal precepts to avoid illegal ends (“blocking the means”) and grant
licenses to permit behavior ordinarily prohibited, when a maṣlaḥa dictated that result. Id. at 68.
The third model, crafted by the Hanbali jurist Najm al-Din al-Tufi, was perhaps the most
radical. He adopted “almost exclusively a substantive rationality” that eschewed formal
procedures and instead depended on an inductive reading of the scriptures, deriving meanings
that were independently discernible by the human intellect, even if the text was completely
silent on the issue. Id. at 68-69. The last model, according to most writers the most
comprehensive, was developed by Maliki jurist Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi. He crafted a scheme that
“provided jurists with a comprehensive system to extend and adapt the law to new
circumstances,” developing a classificatory typology for the universals that lay behind
maslaha, assigning them utilities as either “necessities,” “needs,” or “improvements” in the
law and the purposes of the lawgiver. Id. at 69.
160. FELICITAS OPWIS, MASLAHA AND THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW: ISLAMIC DISCOURSE
ON LEGAL CHANGE FROM THE 4TH/10TH TO 8TH/14TH CENTURY 256 (2010) (paraphrasing an
aspect of Al_Shatibi’s theory of Maslaha).
161. Id. at 257.
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known example of the use of the concept of maṣlaḥa is the decision
by the Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab to suspend the Qur’anic
punishment for theft (amputation of a limb) during the time of a
famine, when many people were stealing food out of desperation.162
In that case the universal concern for life outweighed the particular
concern for enforcement of the criminal punishment for theft. The
ruling can also be supported by Qur’anic provisions announcing that
religion should never be a means of imposing hardship on human
beings.163
The problems of slavery and slave trading in the jurisprudence
and their relationship to the doctrine of maṣlaḥa have not received
much recent attention from the Islamic jurists and scholars of Islam.
This Article posits that the time has come for the dedication of such
attention and that the matter is an urgent one. Scholarly examination
of the applicability of the Islamic doctrine of maṣlaḥa or “public
interest” to the problems of slavery and slave trading is likely to be a
fruitful field of inquiry. Islamic jurisprudence might now be prepared
to see slavery as an “evil” that undermines the Muslim public interest.
As noted earlier, Muhammad Rashid Rida, an early twentieth
century salafist, argued that one of the purposes of the Qur’an was the
“abolishment” of slavery.164 He argued that abolition would gradually
come about as a result of Quranic emancipatory edicts on slavery,
particularly the limitations on the treatment of prisoners of war
legislated by Qur’an 47:4, and the example of the Prophet
Muhammad.165 Scholars have maligned his approach, suggesting that
it relied on al-Tufi’s model of maṣlaḥa and betrayed a utilitarian legal
philosophy rather than a true fidelity to universalist principles.166
This may not be so. There are actually several historical
examples of the use of maṣlaḥa in addressing problems involving
slavery and slave-trading in Muslim communities and suggesting that
162. PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC LAW, supra note 72, at 354.
163. See Qur’an, supra note 26, 22:78 and 5:6.
164. MUHAMMAD RASHID RIDA, THE MUHAMMADAN REVELATION 142-48 (Yusuf
Talal DeLorenzo trans.) (1996).
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., HALLAQ, supra note 35, at 214-20. Professor Hallaq acknowledges,
however, quoting MALCOLM H. KERR, ISLAMIC REFORM; THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL
THEORIES OF MUHAMMAD ‘ABDUH AND RASHID RIDA 201-02 (1966) that Rida’s “equation of
interest and necessity, put forth in such a manner as to make formal deductions from the
revealed sources only a secondary confirmation of what the law should be, amounts to an
affirmation of natural law.”
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jurists and opinion-makers viewed such practices as “evils” to be
condemned. In 1841 Ahmad Bey, the Ottoman governor-general of
the Tunis, issued an edict abolishing the public slave market in Tunis
and the public offices associated with the operation of the market.167
A compiler of the official acts of Ahmad Bey attributed his motives in
closing the market to “pure compassion for black slaves, who were
often treated with cruelty and sold in the market as beasts,
underscoring the Bey’s belief that al-ʿadl (justice) should be extended
to all oppressed subjects” and that “slavery was contradictory to
hurriyat (freedom), a key element of Islamic civilization and
enlightenment.”168
There is no doubt that Ahmad Bey was under great diplomatic
pressure from European governments to halt the slave trade into
Tunisia at this time and that he also desired to demonstrate his
independence from the Ottoman government in Istanbul.169 Yet, the
evidence suggests that Islamic jurisprudence played an important role
in his decision-making. The edict abolishing the Tunisian slave
market was just one of several anti-slavery edicts he issued over a
five-year period, culminating in an 1846 proclamation mandating the
compulsory emancipation of all slaves held by owners in Tunisia. In
its text, the Bey justified the issuance of the proclamation on a
number of grounds, including the cruel treatment of slaves on what
appeared to be racial grounds, the morally reprehensible denial of
justice to many of the victims of the slave-trade, and the
indiscriminate enslavement of many Muslims who were kidnapped
and transported across the Sahara, in violation of very clear Islamic
precepts against the enslavement of Muslims.170 In its last ground, the
edict cited the Islamic principle of maṣlaḥa as a further reason for the
issuance of the edict. This argument was premised on two grounds:
(1) that there were “undesirable political implications” created by the
specter of runaway slaves seeking assistance from foreign
governments as a result of inhumane treatment received within the
Bey’s jurisdiction and (2) these events enabled the foreign
governments to label the government of the Bey as inhumane, which
also damaged its maṣlaḥa al-siyasiyya (public and political
167. See MONTANA, supra note 41, at 84.
168. Id. at 84-85 (citing the compilation of Ahmad Bey’s edicts and L. CARL BROWN,
THE TUNISIA OF AHMAD BEY 321-22, 1837-55 (1974)).
169. Id. at 85.
170. Id. 101-02.
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interests).171 For all of these reasons, the Bey determined to abolish all
aspects of slavery and slave trading within his jurisdiction.
Slavery was not abolished in Saudi Arabia until 1962, over 100
years after the issuance of Ahmad Bey’s proclamation. It has also
been suggested that maṣlaḥa was also the basis for the King of Saudi
Arabia’s 1962 edict requiring all slave-owners in the Kingdom to sell
their slaves to him so that they could be legally emancipated.172 It is
well-known that the Saudi monarchy was coming under increased
condemnation because of its recalcitrance in eliminating slavery.
When Muslims engage in a dialogue with the jurists and
decision-makers in the Islamic State and Boko Haram, it would seem
that the doctrine of maṣlaḥa will be useful to them in seeking to
convince the ISIS/Boko Haram jurists and decision makers that the
public interest and notions of progress demand that those entities take
steps to abolish slavery and slave trading.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that there is a jurisprudential basis for
abolishing slavery in Islamic law. It has also shown that there is a
worldwide consensus similarly holding that slavery is illegal under
international law and a violation of jus cogens principles and that it is
in the Muslim public interest to join that consensus. We have further
observed that modern-day forms of slavery, described as “human
trafficking” by the international authorities and national legislation,
continue to be serious problems in Muslim communities. Legislative
efforts to stamp out these practices by governments in those
communities have not met with much success. We suggest that this is
because there is little awareness, among jurists and among ordinary
believers, of the legal history of slavery and trafficking in Muslim
communities, and still less awareness that Islamic law principles are
available to them in crafting an effort to end these practices.173
Salafism and its relationship to the colonial legacy in the Muslim
world is thus a contributor to this lack of awareness in a way that is
extremely destructive. All of the legislation enacted thus far has
171. Id. at 103.
172. Aharon Layish, Saudi Arabian Legal Reform as a Mechanism to Moderate
Wahhabi Doctrine, 107 J. AM. ORIENTAL SOC’Y 279, 285 (1987).
173. For further discussion on this point see Freamon, Straight, No Chaser, supra note
40, at 62-63.
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followed a secular model. We will begin to see an end to slavery in
the Muslim world when the Islamic principles we have discussed here
begin to be implemented by Muslims in a robust and internally
oriented fashion, engaging the arguments of the jihadi-salafists
directly, honestly, and with courage. A clear understanding of Islamic
legal history demands no less. Muslims should take a lesson from the
words of Frederick Douglass:
At a time like this, scorching irony, not convincing argument, is
needed. Oh! had I the ability, and could I reach the nation’s ear, I
would today pour out a fiery stream of biting ridicule, blasting
reproach, withering sarcasm, and stern rebuke. For it is not light
that is needed, but fire; it is not the gentle shower, but thunder.
We need the storm, the whirlwind, and the earthquake. The
feeling of the nation must be quickened; the conscience of the
nation must be roused; the propriety of the nation must be
startled; the hypocrisy of the nation must be exposed; and its
crimes against God and man must be denounced.174

174. Frederick Douglass, Fourth of July Speech at Rochester, New York (Jul. 4, 1852),
http://www.historyplace.com/sps/douglass.htm.

